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Access to Law or Access to Lawyers? 
Master’s Programs in the Public 
Educational Mission of Law Schools 
MARK EDWIN BURGE* 
The general decline in juris doctor (“J.D.”) law school 
applicants and enrollment over the last decade has coin-
cided with the rise of a new breed of law degree. Whether 
known as master of jurisprudence, juris master, master of 
legal studies, or other names, these graduate degrees all 
have a target audience in common: adult professionals who 
neither are nor seek to become practicing attorneys. Inside 
legal academia and among the practicing bar, these degrees 
have been accompanied by expressed concerns that they de-
tract from the traditional core public mission of law 
schools—educating lawyers. This Article argues that non-
lawyer master’s programs are not a distraction from the 
public mission of law schools, nor are they a necessary evil 
foisted upon legal education by economic trends. Rather, 
such degrees reflect a paradigm shift that law schools and 
attorneys should embrace rather than resist: a move away 
from law being accessed primarily through a licensed elite 
                                                                                                             
 *  Professor of Law and Director of San Antonio Programs, Texas A&M Uni-
versity School of Law. Thanks to many Texas A&M colleagues whose experi-
ences with and conversations about the San Antonio Master of Jurisprudence Pro-
gram helped shape the ideas presented in this article, particularly Charlotte Ku, 
James McGrath, Susan Phillips, Lisa Rich, Frank Snyder, and Nancy Welsh. My 
textbook coauthor Jennifer Murphy Romig and her Emory University School of 
Law colleague Rebecca Purdom deserve special thanks for sharing with me in-
sights regarding legal master’s degrees that transcend any single program. This 
Article is dedicated with love to my wife, Rhonda, and our children Alaina, Lydia, 
and Matthew. They, above all, withstood the slings and arrows of program crea-
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and toward a greater role for autonomy in public engage-
ment with the legal system. The law school function of serv-
ing the public goes well beyond training future lawyers or 
even marshalling them in the service of access to justice. The 
expanded legal education vision advocated here includes 
those functions, but as part of a more encompassing mission. 
Law schools should aim to ensure access to law rather than 
simply access to lawyers. This Article then sets forth founda-
tional frameworks for such programs to succeed at their 
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INTRODUCTION 
Few would dispute the proposition that legal education has been 
in a challenging position during the past decade, a challenge echoing 
changes in the legal profession itself.1 Identification and analysis of 
these challenges is so widespread that it has arguably given rise to 
its own genre of legal scholarship.2 Indeed, the fundamentals of the 
                                                                                                             
 1 See James G. Milles, Legal Education in Crisis, and Why Law Libraries 
Are Doomed, 106 LAW LIBR. J. 507, 507–08 (2014) (“Legal education is in cri-
sis . . . . Many observers both inside and outside of legal education have con-
cluded that law schools are on an unsustainable path.”). 
 2 See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS, at x (2012) (“In 
this book, I explore how law schools have arrived at this sorry state and the im-
plications of this sad condition for the present and future.”); James E. Moliterno, 
And Now a Crisis in Legal Education, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 1069, 1072 (2014) 
(“The current crisis in legal education coincides with a crisis in the practice of 
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“crisis” are well-documented.3 The Great Recession of 2008 ini-
tially showed continued growth in law school applicants and matric-
ulants, a development in line with past precedents of higher educa-
tion running counter-cyclical to the broader economy.4 After 2010, 
however, a post-recession downturn in the legal job market began to 
hit legal education in full force.5 The quantity of the J.D. applicant 
pool went into a sustained decline, eventually bottoming out at num-
bers unseen since the 1970s when far fewer law schools were com-
peting for the same number of students.6 Universities, many of 
which were accustomed to their law schools being a cash-generating 
academic unit, faced the prospect for the first time of subsidizing 
                                                                                                             
law. Law practice has changed as a result of technology, globalization, and eco-
nomic pressures. The market for legal education’s product, law graduates, has 
diminished. Law schools cannot remain the same in this environment.”). But see 
Blake D. Morant, The Continued Evolution of American Legal Education, 51 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 245, 247 (2016) (“Critics will undoubtedly continue to 
question the relevance of the present model of legal education. The staid nature 
of our industry inhibits profound change in the short term. Yet, drastic change is 
neither necessary nor prudent.”). 
 3 See, e.g., Derek T. Muller, Continued Hope for Modest Law School Appli-
cant Increase in 2018, EXCESS OF DEMOCRACY BLOG (May 29, 2018), http://ex-
cessofdemocracy.com/blog/2018/5/continued-hope-for-modest-law-school-ap-
plicant-increase-in-2018 (illustrating longitudinal data on LSAT administrations, 
J.D. applicants, and J.D. matriculants since 2004) [hereinafter Continued Hope 
for Modest Law School Applicant Increase]. 
 4 Continued Hope for Modest Law School Applicant Increase, supra note 3; 
Bridget Terry Long, The Financial Crisis and College Enrollment: How Have 
Students and Their Families Responded? in HOW THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND 
GREAT RECESSION AFFECTED HIGHER EDUCATION 209, 210 (Jeffrey R. Brown & 
Caroline M. Hoxby, eds., 2014) (documenting that “previous research has found 
that college enrollment rates often increase as the unemployment rate grows”). 
 5 See Continued Hope for Modest Law School Applicant Increase, supra 
note 3; Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Graduates Faced Worst 
Job Market Since Mid-1900s: Longstanding Employment Patterns Interrupted 
(June 1, 2011), http://www.nalp.org/uploads/PressReleases/11SelectedFind-
ings.pdf. 
 6 See J. Gordon Hylton, Looking at The Increase in the Number of Law 
Schools and Law Students, 1950-2010, MARQUETTE UNIV. LAW SCH. BLOG (July 
25, 2012), https://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2012/07/looking-at-the-in-
crease-in-the-number-of-law-schools-and-law-students-1950-2010/; Derek T. 
Muller, Law School JD Enrollment Inches Upward as Non-JD Enrollment Con-
tinues to Soar, EXCESS OF DEMOCRACY BLOG (Dec. 14, 2018), https://excessof-
democracy.com/blog/2018/12/law-school-jd-enrollment-inches-upward-as-non-
jd-enrollment-continues-to-soar. 
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that unit on a large and sustained level.7 This unfamiliar situation 
for law schools gave rise to budgetary pressures to right the ship—
or at least minimize the fiscal drain.8 
Law schools and their universities’ responses to the downturn 
have been varied, yet they fundamentally fall into two nonexclusive 
categories: cutting expenditures and increasing revenue.9 This Arti-
cle focuses on one significant development on the revenue side, al-
beit with an acute awareness of its interconnectedness to expendi-
tures. Expanded enrollment in a law school’s bread-and-butter J.D. 
program is, of course, one potential means to address revenue.10 In 
an era of a smaller applicant pool, however, expanded J.D. enroll-
ment is likely to come at an unattractive price: either entering class 
                                                                                                             
 7 See Judith Areen, Legal Education Reconsidered, 50 IND. L. REV. 1087, 
1088 (2017) (“Because most law schools rely on tuition as their primary source 
of revenue, the drop in qualified applicants means that a significant number of 
American law schools are operating in the red—many for the first time ever. This 
is quite a turnaround from the days not so long ago when many law schools were 
viewed as cash cows by their universities because they so easily enrolled qualified 
students.”). 
 8 See, e.g., Jonah Meadows, Northwestern Law School Cuts Faculty, Staff 
Amid Budget Deficit, PATCH (Nov. 9, 2018), https://patch.com/illinois/evans-
ton/northwestern-law-school-cuts-faculty-staff-amid-budget-deficit (noting  
that Northwestern Law School cut faculty and staff to ease its “challenging finan-
cial position”); Jane Stancill, UNC Law School’s Budget Is Cut – But It Could 
Have Been Worse, NEWS & OBSERVER (June 20, 2017, 11:25 AM), 
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/education/article157121589.html 
(detailing the North Carolina Senate’s decision to cut $500,000 from UNC’s law 
school budget). 
 9 See e.g., Meadows, supra note 8 (exemplifying the expenditure-cutting 
strategy); See generally HANOVER RESEARCH, ALTERNATIVE REVENUE 
GENERATION PRACTICES FOR LAW SCHOOLS 2 (2013) (providing an overview of 
revenue generation strategies undertaken by law schools). 
 10 See, e.g., Stephanie Francis Ward, Faced with Dwindling Admissions, 
Some Law Schools Seek out Overachieving 1Ls, A.B.A. J. (April 21, 2017, 4:15 
PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_school_transfers_grow_tak-
ing_achieving_1ls_to_higher_ranking_schools (“Law schools are increasingly 
interested in taking transfer students to bring in more revenue.”). 
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credentials, such as those represented by LSAT scores, can be com-
promised at the later cost of bar passage rates11 and diminished rank-
ings,12 or entering class credentials can be maintained by offering 
increased scholarships or tuition discounts.13 The latter approach 
may be desirable based on other institutional goals, but it then un-
dermines the positive financial impact of having a larger class.14 An-
other approach—and one that is the focus of this Article—is to in-
crease the target audience for legal education outside the realm of 
aspiring lawyers. While law school finances tend to be the crisis15 
that brought expanded legal education to the forefront, I argue here 
that the development of graduate law degrees not targeted toward 
prospective or existing lawyers is a positive change for both law 
                                                                                                             
 11 Kristin Booth Glen, When and Where We Enter: Rethinking Admission to 
the Legal Profession, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1696, 1701 n.13 (2002) (“Not surpris-
ingly, bar passage correlates to LSAT scores.”); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Knots in 
the Pipeline for Prospective Lawyers of Color: The LSAT Is Not the Problem and 
Affirmative Action Is Not the Answer, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 379, 409 (2013) 
(“As should be clear by now, there is a correlation between LSAT score and 
LGPA. There is also a strong correlation between LSAT score and bar passage. 
There is an even stronger correlation among LSAT, LGPA, and bar passage.”). 
 12 See, e.g., Heather Baier, Marshall-Wythe School of Law Drops 12 Spots in 
U.S. News Rankings Since 2015, FLAT HAT (April 17, 2018), http://flathat-
news.com/2018/04/17/marshall-wythe-school-of-law-drops-in-rankings/ (“An-
other factor that drove the ranking down was that the College’s law school main-
tained a consistent class size despite a large fall in applications after the 2008 
recession.”). 
 13 See, e.g., Staci Zaretsky, Law School Makes ‘Significant’ Tuition Cuts to 
Compete for Students, ABOVE THE LAW (July 1, 2019, 1:43 PM), 
https://abovethelaw.com/2019/07/law-school-makes-significant-tuition-cuts-to-
compete-for-students/ (reporting law school tuition decreases at the University of 
Hawaii and the University of South Carolina). 
 14 See id. (noting that the University of South Carolina School of Law was 
only able to cut tuition after lawmakers agreed to increase the state’s spending on 
the school by $8 million). 
 15 See generally Bernard A. Burk, Jerome M. Organ, & Emma B. Rasiel, 
Competitive Coping Strategies in the American Legal Academy: An Empirical 
Study, 19 NEV. L.J. 583, 598 (2018) (“[F]rom its inflation-adjusted peak in 2011-
12 until 2016-17, overall average Tuition Revenue fell over one-third (-35 per-
cent). In constant 2018 dollars, we estimate that annual Tuition Revenue for all 
accredited law schools in 2016-17 was over $1.5 billion less than it had been in 
2011-12—an average decrease of over $9 million in annual Tuition Revenue per 
law school.”); see id. at 600 (“It would be no exaggeration to call these changes 
sudden, enormous, and drastic.”). 
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schools and the public they serve, regardless of prospective financial 
benefits. 
Readers should be aware that—both for better and for worse—I 
approach the topic of non-lawyer master’s programs from a partic-
ular perspective borne of personal experience, so I will briefly re-
count that experience here. My dean at Texas A&M University 
School of Law asked me to oversee the launch of and to initially 
direct Texas A&M’s new San Antonio program, which would fea-
ture a master of jurisprudence (“M. Jur.”) degree program in busi-
ness law and compliance—with business law being broadly con-
ceived as law relevant to business professionals.16 Thus, the curric-
ulum ranged from courses traditionally included under the “busi-
ness” heading, like contracts and business associations, to courses 
with high relevance to business professionals, like employment law, 
environmental compliance, and intellectual property.17 The pro-
gram, in line with university and system administrative goals reflect-
ing the statewide component of our university’s global footprint, 
was to be built around a physical presence and live classroom set-
ting. For those unfamiliar with Texas A&M and our home state’s 
geography, the law school is based in Fort Worth, and San Antonio 
is roughly 268 miles (assuming normal traffic, a four-plus hour 
drive) away.18 While launch of any new program comes packaged 
with a set of challenges, distance magnified those challenges and 
created new ones. 
                                                                                                             
 16 See generally Master of Jurisprudence Program in Business Law and Com-
pliance, TEX. A&M U. SCH. OF LAW, http://law.tamu.edu/llm-mjur-programs/san-
antonio-mjur-program/m-jur-program (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (summarizing 
Texas A&M’s Master of Jurisprudence Program in Business Law and Compli-
ance, launched in San Antonio in 2017). 
 17 Frequently Asked Questions About Masters of Jurisprudence in Business 
Law and Compliance, TEX. A&M U. SCH. LAW, https://law.tamu.edu/llm-mjur-
programs/san-antonio-mjur-program/m-jur-program/faqs (last visited Oct. 15, 
2019). 
 18 Driving Directions from Fort Worth, TX to San Antonio, TX., GOOGLE 
MAPS, http://maps.google.com (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then search start-
ing point field for “Fort Worth, TX” and search destination field for “San Antonio, 
TX”). Arguably complicating matters a bit more is the fact that the main campus 
of Texas A&M University is in College Station, which is about 175 miles from 
Fort Worth and 170 miles from San Antonio—both excursions being in excess of 
two-and-a-half hours’ drive. 
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In retrospect, however, the distance turned out to be an important 
and beneficial driver of the launch and ongoing development of the 
program because it forced a rethinking of nearly every aspect of its 
design. The less complicated way—in both cost and logistics—for 
a law school to handle course offerings for a non-lawyer degree is 
to teach the master’s students as add-ons in existing J.D. classes.19 
That option is impractical where the J.D. courses are taught over a 
four-hour drive away. Similarly, while bridging distance with fully 
online courses is an approach growing in popularity (and one that 
my home institution has successfully implemented elsewhere)20 go-
ing wholly online was not an option where the program mission re-
quired a physical presence. By design, the program would need to 
appeal to prospective students who valued face-to-face instruction, 
but whose professional commitments also placed a premium on hav-
ing some degree of flexibility. The hurdles of space and time forced 
a rethinking of ways and means to teach these master’s students. An 
innovative and building-from-the-ground-up approach is, fortu-
nately, more likely to happen outside the walls of existing structures, 
whether those structures be physical or administrative.21 Here, the 
curse of physical distance ironically turned out to be a blessing. 
Working within restrictions forced a top-to-bottom analysis of pro-
gram purposes and priorities, an analysis that informs this Article. 
The experience also strengthened my belief in the intrinsic value of 
non-lawyer master’s degree programs. 
                                                                                                             
 19 See Martin H. Belsky, Preparing New Students for Legal Practice in a 
“Flat World,” 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 787, 793–94 (2006) (explaining how 
opening up courses to add additional students from other departments involves 
only marginal costs); see e.g., Master of Legal Studies Program, WILLAMETTE 
U., http://willamette.edu/law/programs/degree-programs/mls/index.html (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2019) (noting that Master of Legal Studies students may take 
nearly “all of the courses taught at the Willamette University College of Law”). 
 20 See Distance Education Programs, TEX. A&M U. SCH. LAW, 
http://law.tamu.edu/distance-education (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (describing 
fully online legal education specialty programs in risk management and wealth 
management). 
 21 See MICHELE R. PISTONE & MICHAEL B. HORN, DISRUPTING LAW SCHOOL: 
HOW DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION WILL REVOLUTIONIZE THE LEGAL WORLD 
16 https://www.christenseninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Disrupting-
law-school.pdf (“Disruptive innovators [in legal education], on the other hand, 
start with a blank slate. And, as a result, they may approach educational design 
very differently from traditional law schools.”). 
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Despite the economic downturn in which these innovative pro-
grams arose, this Article argues that they are a welcome develop-
ment, one that law schools should embrace as part of their core pub-
lic service mission. While the worthy goals of access to justice and 
to the legal system are traditionally conceived in terms of ensuring 
access to lawyers, the more appropriate organizing vision for law 
schools in the twenty-first century is that of providing access to law, 
a term used here to encompass public engagement with law and le-
gal structures—both with and without lawyer guidance.22 Part I of 
this Article provides background on law schools’ evolving position 
in the larger university setting, ultimately suggesting that the dimi-
nution of “law school exceptionalism”23 is actually an opportunity 
to prove a larger institutional value proposition within the broader 
university. Next, Part II argues for specific application of that value 
in the arena that is the focus of this Article, the non-lawyer master’s 
degree—known variously as a master of jurisprudence (“M.Jur.”),24 
a juris master (“J.M.”),25 a master of legal studies (“M.L.S.”),26 and 
a master of studies in law (“M.S.L.”),27 among other names. Part III 
describes what the meaningful implementation of a legal master’s 
                                                                                                             
 22 See Robert Grey Jr., There Is No Justice as Long as Millions Lack Mean-
ingful Access to It, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 30, 2018, 6:05 AM), http://www.abajour-
nal.com/news/article/there_is_no_justice_as_long_as_millions_lack_meaning-
ful_access_to_it. 
 23 Broadly speaking, the term “law school exceptionalism” refers to actual or 
asserted reasons why a law school is unlike the rest of its university. See, e.g., 
Peter W. Martin, Employing Technology to Erode Legal Education’s Twin Barri-
ers of Distance and Cost, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 1115, 1124 (2009) (criticizing cer-
tain special accreditation restrictions imposed upon law schools by the American 
Bar Association based upon the schools’ difference from the rest of the univer-
sity); Richard A. Matasar, Higher Education Evolved: Becoming the University 
of Value, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 689, 698 (2016) (comparing higher education 
trends with those of law schools) [hereinafter Higher Education Evolved]. 
 24 See Master of Jurisprudence (“M.Jur.”) Degree Program, TEX. A&M U. 
SCH. LAW, http://law.tamu.edu/llm-mjur-programs/san-antonio-mjur-pro-
gram/m-jur-program (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). 
 25 See Juris Master (JM), EMORY L., http://law.emory.edu/admission/juris-
master/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). 
 26 See Online Master of Legal Studies Degree (“MLS”), PEPPERDINE L., 
https://onlinelaw.pepperdine.edu/mls/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). 
 27 See Master of Studies in Law (“MSL”) Degree, USC GOULD 
https://gould.usc.edu/academics/degrees/msl/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). 
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program looks like where one accepts the proposition that its learn-
ing outcomes and subsidiary course designs have significant foun-
dational differences with the outcomes and designs of J.D. pro-
grams. This Article concludes by pulling together its normative and 
practical threads to argue for a robust embrace of non-lawyer legal 
education by the academy. 
While their foundational purpose of educating lawyers must re-
main intact, law schools in a liberal and democratic republic have a 
broader public mission. Although that mission certainly does en-
compass achieving public access to justice through access to edu-
cated lawyers, the educational goals should actually be much 
broader: the core public mission of a twenty-first century law school 
is and should be access to law. Enabling such access through degree 
programs outside the J.D. and LL.M. is a critical piece of accepting 
this broader mission. 
I. LAW SCHOOL EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE UNIVERSITY 
Although much of the debate over the American law school’s 
role in the academy and in the public at large over the past decade 
was provoked by economic concerns, the underlying issues seeking 
resolution have a much longer pedigree.28 Until the late nineteenth 
century, law schools were outsiders to the university, being casti-
gated as a trade school rather than an academic endeavor.29 Argu-
ably, the most consequential of Christopher Columbus Langdell’s 
                                                                                                             
 28 See Areen, supra note 7, at 1088-89. 
 29 See Peter Toll Hoffman, Teaching Theory Versus Practice: Are We Train-
ing Lawyers or Plumbers? 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 625, 626 (2012) (“The advo-
cates of teaching theory have seized the semantic high ground in the discussion 
by labeling the teaching of lawyering skills as ‘teaching nuts and bolts’ and ac-
cusing those who advocate for such courses as wanting to ‘run a trade school.’ In 
a university-based law school where most of the other academic departments, 
such as chemistry or physics, pride themselves on engaging in pure knowledge-
based research, these labels are serious insults.”). 
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achievements in legal education was not the Socratic method of in-
struction30 or creation of the casebook,31 but rather gaining the ac-
ceptance of legal education as a worthwhile endeavor in the univer-
sity setting.32 Still, the merging of law into the university has been 
far from seamless and in many respects has never been fully accom-
plished, both sides having agreed to live in a mutually beneficial 
ambiguity over the last several decades.33 The fading mutuality of 
the benefit has caused universities to rethink the relationships with 
their law schools,34 occasionally to the dramatic level of severing 
the relationship.35 Economic stress has brought to the forefront an 
                                                                                                             
 30 Jamie R. Abrams, Reframing the Socratic Method, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 562, 
565 (2015) (“The case-based Socratic method became the dominant method of 
delivering legal education in 1870, first introduced by Christopher Langdell of 
Harvard University. Socratic teaching remains foundational to legal education and 
particularly central to first-year courses and upper-level bar examination 
courses.”) 
 31 Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Socratic Method in the Age of Trauma, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 2320, 2322 (2017) (“Langdell, by then dean of the [Harvard] law 
school, made good on his proposal by publishing a new kind of book for use in 
teaching: the first ‘casebook,’ A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts.”); 
see generally C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co. 1871). 
 32 Bruce A. Kimball, Christopher Langdell: The Case of an ‘Abomination’ in 
Teaching Practice, in THOUGHT & ACTION 23, 33 (Con Lehane ed., 2004). 
 33 See Moliterno, supra note 2, at 1071. 
 34 See, e.g., Maura Lerner, University of Minnesota Law School Seeks Subsi-
dies to Maintain Top Ranking, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIBUNE (May 28, 2018, 
10:30 AM), http://www.startribune.com/university-of-minnesota-law-school-
seeks-subsidies-to-maintain-top-ranking/483829781/ (“But some regents are 
growing weary of the law school’s repeated requests for help, after pumping in 
$17 million in subsidies to cover its year-end deficits since 2013.”). 
 35 See, e.g., Sonali Kahli et al., Whittier Law School is Closing, Due in Part 
to Low Student Achievement, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2017, 8:55 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-edu-whittier-law-school-closing-
20170420-story.html (“Radha Pathak, the law school’s associate dean of student 
and alumni engagement, criticized trustees for failing to keep their pledges even 
after one-third of the tenured and tenure-track faculty took the buyout to help keep 
the law school afloat. ‘There are other law schools that receive support in chal-
lenging economic times from their institutions,’ Pathak said. ‘We haven’t re-
ceived that kind of monetary support.’”); Emma Whitford, Another Law School 
Will Close, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.insidehigh-
ered.com/news/2018/10/31/valparaiso-law-school-will-close-following-unsuc-
cessful-attempt-transfer-middle (“In 2017, Valparaiso Law School announced 
that it would no longer admit new students. Remaining students have the option 
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inevitable question, albeit one significantly unresolved since Lang-
dell’s day: is the law school an integral part of its university, or is it 
an exceptional and luxury add-on to be dispensed with if necessary? 
This Part addresses the history behind law schools’ ambiguous—
and now occasionally precarious—status in the academy. Such 
background enables exploring and justifying the non-economic ben-
efits of non-lawyer master’s degrees as a desirable further integra-
tion of law schools into the DNA of its parent university. 
A.  Breaking into the Academy 
Law school in the United States is an immigrant to the univer-
sity, not a native.36 Until the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
“most preparation for admission to the bar in the United States had 
taken place outside of the university, as it had in England.”37 Pro-
spective lawyers typically worked under practicing lawyers to learn 
the profession while also reading law books in the office.38 Alterna-
tively, where the supervision of a practicing attorney was unavaila-
ble, “the student might read law independently.”39 Where formal 
law schools did appear, they tended to be proprietary and practi-
tioner-driven.40 
The practical apprenticeship approach to learning law faced a 
challenge in earnest with the appointment of C.C. Langdell as the 
                                                                                                             
to transfer out of the law school, and current faculty and staff have signed an 
agreement with the university to stay until the end of this [2018-2019] academic 
year”). 
 36 See Beverly I. Moran, Disappearing Act: The Lack of Values Training in 
Legal Education — A Case for Cultural Competency, 38 S.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2010) 
(“Prior to the late nineteenth century, both medical education and legal education 
existed outside universities.”). 
 37 Carlo A. Pedrioli, Constructing Modern-Day U.S. Legal Education with 
Rhetoric: Langdell, Ames, and the Scholar Model of the Law Professor Persona, 
66 RUTGERS L. REV. 55, 55 (2013) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 55-56. 
 40 Gene R. Shreve, History of Legal Education Law School: Legal Education 
in America from the 1850s to the 1980s, 97 HARV. L. REV. 597, 598-99 (1983) 
(“The most significant law schools of the early 1800’s were not closely affiliated 
branches of established universities, but rather proprietary law schools . . . which 
were outgrowths of the law offices of practitioners who had shown themselves to 
be particularly accomplished teachers.”). 
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dean of Harvard Law School in 1870.41 Langdell is remembered for 
his lasting innovations in legal education, including the use of So-
cratic questioning and the case method.42  He is also known for the 
ultimately discredited notion43 that law is susceptible to being con-
sidered as a “science” under which proper analysis must inexorably 
lead to a single correct result.44 The adoption of language and meth-
ods of science, while destined to fade, immediately aided Langdell 
in a quest where his argument ultimately prevailed: law is an aca-
demic discipline that ought to be housed in the natural home of ac-
ademia—the university.45 The hard sciences had been particularly 
embraced by universities in the late nineteenth century.46 Associa-
tion of law with scientific methodology could and did achieve a sim-
ilar admission of law into respectable academia.47 By undertaking 
“the scientific approach to law,” law schools consciously “sought to 
move from trade-school status to attain standing as true professional 
schools and legitimate members of the scholarly academy.”48 
Though universities had housed law schools on-and-off well be-
fore 1870,49 the concept that law was an academic endeavor was far 
                                                                                                             
 41 See id. at 599–600. 
 42 Abrams, supra note 30, at 565; Gersen, supra note 31, at 2321. 
 43 See Keith A. Findley, Rediscovering the Lawyer School: Curriculum Re-
form in Wisconsin, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 295, 300 (2006) (“Langdell’s notion of law 
as a science did not survive the realism movement of the 1920s and 1930s.”). 
 44 Mark Edwin Burge, Without Precedent: Legal Analysis in the Age of Non-
Judicial Dispute Resolution, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 143, 147 (2013); 
Nancy Cook, Law as Science: Revisiting Langdell’s Paradigm in the 21st Cen-
tury, 88 N.D. L. REV. 21, 34 (2012) (“In a very short time, the scientific theory 
paradigm attributed to Langdell was ‘obsolete in entirety.”‘) (quoting Edward Ru-
bin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do About It, 60 VAND. 
L. REV. 609, 635 (2007)). 
 45 Kurt M. Saunders & Linda Levine, Learning to Think Like a Lawyer, 29 
U.S.F. L. REV. 121, 129 (1994) (asserting that part of Langdell’s motive in con-
ceptualizing law as a science was “to secure the place of law schools within the 
American university.”). 
 46 Moran, supra note 36, at 5 (“Instead of seeing the university as a place to 
infuse upper-class young men with ‘civilization’ through studies of Greek, Latin, 
Theology, and History, [nineteenth century] universities began to picture them-
selves as centers of knowledge production that trained scientists and engineers 
and housed researcher/scholar faculties.”). 
 47 Accord id. at 5. 
 48 Findley, supra note 43, at 299. 
 49 Shreve, supra note 40, at 599 (observing that “[t]he 1850’s brought re-
newed interest by universities in legal education). 
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from self-evident.50 “Many within the liberal arts elite strongly re-
sisted the view that either law in particular or professional training 
in general had a place within the college or university curriculum.”51 
Legal education was in many respects a branch of the legal profes-
sion rather than an academic discipline.52 Even today, legal educa-
tion is arguably “in fact jointly owned and managed by the academic 
branch of the [legal] profession, by the practicing branch of the legal 
profession through the accreditation and licensing processes, and by 
the universities.”53 This background makes it less surprising that 
turn-of-the-century economist and sociologist Thorstein Veblen 
could remark that “the law school belongs in the modern university 
no more than a school of fencing or dancing.”54 Legal academia has, 
both then and now, fought against any perception that law school is 
a technical trade school.55 The term “trade school” is generally used 
as an agreed pejorative in discussions of legal education, a fate un-
questionably to be avoided.56 Indeed, advocates of practical skills 
                                                                                                             
 50 See W. Burlette Carter, Reconstructing Langdell, 32 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 
(1997) (describing “those within the university who believed that law was not 
appropriate for study there”). 
 51 Id. 
 52 See Pedrioli, supra note 37, at 55. 
 53 Moliterno, supra note 2, at 1071. 
 54 John Henry Schlegel, Langdell’s Legacy or, the Case of the Empty Enve-
lope, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1517 (1984) (citing THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE HIGHER 
LEARNING IN AMERICA 211 (1918)). 
 55 This struggle is by no means unique to the United States, as Australian 
experience indicates. See Susan Bartie, Towards a History of Law as an Academic 
Discipline, 38 MELB. U. L. REV. 444, 458 (2014) (“When eventually the Vice-
Chancellor proclaimed that the time had come to include law within the [New 
South Wales, Australia] University he was criticised for his vulgar resort to ‘util-
ity’ in legal education. [Professor Linda] Martin suggests that the movement of 
legal education into the University was not delayed by lack of funding, but by a 
pervasive belief that there was little value in practical university legal studies.”). 
 56 See Martin Katz, Why This Time Is Different: The Perfect Storm and the 
Future of Legal Education, U. DENVER: INST. FOR ADVANCEMENT AM. LEGAL 
SYS. BLOG (Oct. 10, 2011), https://online.iaals.du.edu/blog/why-time-different-
perfect-storm-and-future-legal-education (recounting several decades where 
“most law schools were trying to build their reputation by distancing themselves 
from anything that might cause them to resemble a “trade school” (a term that 
tended to be used quite pejoratively)”). 
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education in law schools often feel the need to affirmatively dis-
claim any attempt to turn law school into a trade school.57 
Nonetheless, Langdell’s position, as carried forward by the sus-
tained influence and example of Harvard’s law school, ultimately 
resulted in “two important, permanent gains” for legal education in 
establishing its place in the academy.58 Specifically, “[u]niversity 
law school training ‘was established as de rigeur for leaders of the 
profession,’ and ‘law was accepted, finally and irrevocably, as an 
appropriate study for university education.’”59 With legal education 
obtaining the prestige and respectability as part of the university,60 
what benefit was there to the university in absorbing law into its 
intellectual infrastructure? Beyond the reflected respectability of 
law as a then-ostensibly scientific endeavor, universities secured 
two practical benefits. First, the university obtained access to the 
primary occupation of influential elected officials.61 While legisla-
tors and others in the government were not exclusively lawyers, they 
                                                                                                             
 57 See, e.g., Carol Goforth, Transactional Skills Training Across the Curric-
ulum, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 904, 918 (2017) (“Certainly some faculty members re-
sist the push for more skills training, seeing it as an effort to turn law schools into 
‘trade schools’ rather than institutions of higher learning.”); Elizabeth Adamo Us-
man, Nurturing the Law Student’s Soul: Why Law Schools Are Still Struggling to 
Teach Professionalism and How to Do Better in an Age of Consumerism, 99 
MARQ. L. REV. 1021, 1043 (2016) (“The legal academy long resisted such re-
forms, viewing practical skills training as the ‘grubby’ stuff of ‘trade schools,’ 
rather than the more rarified theoretical air of graduate education.”) (internal quo-
tations and footnotes omitted); Matthew J. Wilson, U.S. Legal Education Methods 
and Ideals: Application to the Japanese and Korean Systems, 18 CARDOZO J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 295, 350 (2010) (“Some legal educators harbor concerns that 
an excessive emphasis on practical skills courses will transform law schools from 
reputable academic institutions into technical trade schools.”); Dianne Molvig, 
Learning to Be A Lawyer, WIS. LAW., Sept. 1996, at 12 (“You don’t want law 
school to become a trade school; it’s a professional school.”) (quoting Gerald 
Thain). 
 58 Shreve, supra note 40, at 600 (reviewing and quoting ROBERT STEVENS, 
LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 36 
(1983)) (internal citations omitted). 
 59 Id. 
 60 See Penelope Pether, Measured Judgments: Histories, Pedagogies, and the 
Possibility of Equity, 14 LAW & LITERATURE 489, 501 (2002) (arguing that many 
of Langdell’s categories of legal doctrine were “necessitated by the battle to turn 
law into an intellectually respectable university discipline.”). 
 61 See Paula A. Monopoli, Gender and the Crisis in Legal Education: Remak-
ing the Academy in Our Image, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1745, 1754 (2012) (citing 
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were disproportionately so. Second, “law schools, with large lec-
tures and without expensive laboratories, were profit centers for uni-
versities.”62 Historically, universities have “profited significantly by 
the legal profession’s process of creating new members.” 63 That op-
portunity for university profit has diminished significantly along 
with the past decade’s diminished demand for legal education.64 
While universities still benefit from the place of lawyers as lead-
ers in American society,65 the consistent status of law schools as 
university profit centers has vanished over the past decade and 
seems ill-positioned to return, at least not to the sustained levels of 
past decades.66 This adjustment to the underlying economic rela-
tionship between universities and their law schools suggests that law 
schools should rethink the scope of their missions, a rethinking that 
should be generated within the law school, but also one that certainly 
could be imposed by the university. 
B.  In the University—Not of It. 
Law schools have been characterized, correctly on many points, 
as having a “very different academic culture” from the rest of the 
university.67 Despite the fact that law schools sought and ultimately 
obtained the standing and prestige that accompanied being a univer-
sity-recognized academic endeavor, they simultaneously retained a 
                                                                                                             
William D. Henderson, The Inferiority Complex of Law Schools, NAT’L JURIST, 
Mar. 2012, at 4, 4–5). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Moliterno, supra note 2, at 1071. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Laura Stein, Reflection on Lawyers as Leaders, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1841, 
1841 (2017) (“Lawyers as leaders have long used the law to make a real differ-
ence, to matter, and to help.”). 
 66 See David Yellen, Post-Crisis Legal Education: Some Premature 
Thoughts, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 523, 528 (2016) (“There was a time when many 
law schools were profit centers for their universities . . . .Today, however, many 
universities are, in effect, subsidizing their law schools, often to the tune of mil-
lions of dollars a year . . . .If the financial outlook of legal education does im-
prove, universities will look to recoup some of the losses they have suffered while 
supporting their law schools during the crisis.”). 
 67 Victor G. Rosenblum, Book Reviews, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 308 (1996); 
DAVID DAMROSCH, WE SCHOLARS: CHANGING THE CULTURE OF THE UNIVERSITY 
(1995). 
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certain amount of distance from their academic home.68 Law 
schools tend to persist in a certain amount of exceptionalism among 
units of a university, much of it stemming from their sustained po-
sition of economic self-sufficiency that characterized these units 
during most of the last century.69 This Section suggests that, while 
law schools do have many inherently distinguishing qualities among 
the academic units, traditionally high degrees of insulation from uni-
versity programs and practices are contributing to a hindrance of 
imagination in means of serving the public. Non-lawyer graduate 
programs are one area where law schools’ imaginations ought to 
flourish in finding means of reaching the public, but legal education 
is, in many respects, a latecomer to this notion. 
The circumstances of law schools’ existence within their univer-
sities are varied, and some of these circumstances are not exclusive 
to law. Consider, for example, the lack of an undergraduate connec-
tion.70 A number of distinctions between law and other academic 
units arises as an unavoidable consequence of law’s adoption into 
academia as a professional school without any undergraduate aca-
demic programs.71 In the United States, almost no one “majors” in 
law,72 at least not in the sense that law schools teach the field. The 
                                                                                                             
 68 F. Allan Hanson, From Key Numbers to Keywords: How Automation Has 
Transformed the Law, 94 L. LIBR. J. 563, 572 (2002) (“Traditionally, law schools 
tended to keep aloof from other schools in the university. Law schools usually 
have their own buildings. The law library is separate from other university librar-
ies and contains almost exclusively legal materials. The segregation of students 
has been nearly total. Undergraduate programs in law are rare; virtually no one 
but law students take law courses, who in turn take nothing outside the law 
school.”). 
 69 See Monopoli, supra note 61, at 1754. 
 70 See Hanson, supra note 68, at 572. 
 71 Id. 
 72 One noteworthy exception to this absence of an undergraduate major in 
law is at the University of Arizona, which offers a bachelor of arts that it charac-
terizes as the “nation’s only undergraduate law degree.” U. ARIZ. JAMES E. 
ROGERS C. L., https://law.arizona.edu/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2019). The University 
of Arizona may not be alone in this field for long, however. See Karen Sloan, 
Ahead of the Curve: Here Come the Undergraduate Law Degrees, LAW.COM (Jul. 
9, 2019, 3:42 PM), https://www.law.com/2019/07/09/ahead-of-the-curve-here-
come-the-undergraduate-law-degrees/ (“At the end of June, the State University 
of New York at Buffalo Law School announced its plans to launch an undergrad-
uate degree in law, taught by the law faculty. It will become just the second such 
program in the United States.”). 
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same distinction applies to other professional programs, such as 
medical schools and dental schools,73 however, and thus does not 
fully stand out as a difference. More telling is the fact undergradu-
ates who wish to become lawyers are unlikely to find much agree-
ment on what a “prelaw” curriculum should look like—or even 
whether such a thing truly exists.74 Such openness contrasts with the 
medical fields where matriculants are required to have a robust and 
particularized undergraduate background in relevant science and 
math courses.75 
Even where law schools adopted the trappings and practices of 
other parts of academia, implementation has remained distinctive. 
Law reviews have certainly been a means by which law schools have 
contributed “to the larger university setting” by adding to the uni-
versity’s output of scholarly journals.76 But as American legal aca-
demics know full well, the leading journals in law do not operate 
like their counterparts in other disciplines.77 Law review editors are 
                                                                                                             
 73 Allen Chen, From Premed to Physician: Pursuing a Medical Career, 
BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2017/article/premed 
.htm (Dec. 2017). 
 74 Pre-Law: Preparing for Law School, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar 
.org/groups/legal_education/resources/pre_law/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). 
 75 One popular preparatory advice site for medical school identifies courses 
in biology, chemistry, physics, and mathematics as being “nearly universal” pre-
requisites for admission to medical school. The Prerequisites for Medical School, 
KAPLAN, https://www.kaptest.com/study/mcat/the-prerequisites-of-medical-
school/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). Many schools have additional but varying 
requirements beyond these. See id. 
 76 Pedrioli, supra note 37, at 63–64. 
 77 See Albert H. Yoon, Editorial Bias in Legal Academia, 5 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 309, 311 (2013). 
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upper-level students rather than academics.78 Acceptance for publi-
cation is typically not based on a peer-review process.79 These dif-
ferences may or may not be positive ones,80 but they unquestionably 
make legal academic publishing a different creature than exists in 
other disciplines.81 Furthermore, scholarship in law has tended to be 
less collaborative than that done in other units of the university 
where collaboration and co-authorship are the norm rather than the 
exception, a situation perhaps attributable to the traditional solo na-
ture of law practice.82 
The J.D. academic program has, within the graduate programs 
of the university, maintained pedagogical traits that broadly defy 
classification as fish or fowl, being neither intensely practical nor 
profoundly theoretical.83 Legal pedagogy, coming from such a dif-
ferent place with its signature (though not exclusive) Socratic 
                                                                                                             
 78 Id. (“Law reviews differ from peer-review journals . . . .Most significantly, 
the editors are law students, not faculty.”); see also Miami Law Review Staff, 
University of Miami Law Review Volume 74 Editorial Board Announced, U. 
MIAMI SCH. L. (March 19, 2019), https://www.law.miami.edu/news/ 
2019/march/university-miami-law-review-volume-74-editorial-board-an-
nounced. 
 79 Richard A. Wise et al., Do Law Reviews Need Reform? A Survey of Law 
Professors, Student Editors, Attorneys, and Judges, 59 LOY. L. REV. 1, 9 (2013) 
(recognizing that “student editors generally do not use peer review” in law re-
views’ article selection process). 
 80 See Jeffrey L. Harrison & Amy R. Mashburn, Citations, Justifications, and 
the Troubled State of Legal Scholarship: An Empirical Study, 3 TEX. A&M L. 
REV. 45, 57 (2015) (acknowledging the existence of an argument that reform ef-
forts in legal scholarship “are hopeless because legal scholarship would simply 
trade one set of problems (e.g., article selection bias by students) for another (e.g., 
article selection bias by peers).”). 
 81 Id. at 57-58. 
 82 See Carol Weisbrod, Building Community in Sarastro’s Dungeon, 9 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. 443, 455 (1997) (noting that David Riesman suggested in 1951 
that lawyers showed a tendency to become “hard-working isolates”). See also 
Randy Frances Kandel, Whither the Legal Whale: Interdisciplinarity and the So-
cialization of Professional Identity, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 9, 14 (1993) (“Lawyers, 
for the most part, work with and against other lawyers rather than in teams com-
prised of people from different specialties.”). 
 83 Kandel, supra note 82, at 19 (suggesting that law schools “have met the 
requirements of mass mental feeding by purging legal education of the visceral 
experiences apprentices receive and the abstract theoretical mastication graduate 
students must do”). 
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method of instruction has tended to be behind the curve on innova-
tion as compared to other academic units.84 While “general research 
on teaching adult learners has been conducted in universities 
(mainly in Schools of Education) for a long time,” such research 
“rarely filtered down to law faculties.”85 Moreover, the research that 
did “usually did not deal directly with the somewhat unique law 
school setting.”86 
Until the financial upheaval of the last decade, law schools had 
the luxury of being insulated from university integration due to their 
financial independence.87 As net contributors to the central coffers 
in a way that would be neither possible nor expected for most de-
partments in, for instance, the liberal arts and social sciences, law 
schools could (and did) skirt much in the way of university integra-
tion and administrative mandates.88 
Taken together, these factors resulted in law schools that were 
housed within universities yet were in many respects isolated from 
them.89 Law as a profession trained in the academy will always have 
                                                                                                             
 84 Abrams, supra note 30, at 562-63. 
 85 Arturo L. Torres & Karen E. Harwood, Moving Beyond Langdell: An An-
notated Bibliography of Current Methods for Law Teaching, 29 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 
2 (1994). 
 86 Id. 
 87 See, e.g., Gregory W. Bowman, The Three Pillars of A Successful Law 
School, W. VA. LAW., Autumn 2019, at 10 (“For many decades and until very 
recently, law schools could operate with relatively high levels of autonomy within 
their universities, due largely to law school finances and to the fact that their pro-
fessional educational programming was relatively independent from the educa-
tional programming of their home university.”); Eli Wald, A Thought Experiment 
About the Academic “Billable” Hour or Law Professors’ Work Habits, 101 
MARQ. L. REV. 991, 1015 (2018) (recounting that “[l]aw schools and their profes-
sors tend to be relatively insulated from pressures affecting other parts of the uni-
versity.”). 
 88 Accord David Barnhizer, Redesigning the American Law School, 2010 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 249, 269 (2010) (noting that law schools “have been largely 
insulated from public scrutiny by their connection to the ABA and status as parts 
of the university institution”). 
 89 See Kandel, supra note 82, at 18 (observing that “the decision to make law 
schools postgraduate institutions resulted in the study of law being separated from 
the study of philosophy, political science, economics, and other related sub-
jects.”). 
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a core essence, and will include an expectation that “someone aspir-
ing to the profession is to be immersed in” that essence. 90 The dis-
tinctiveness that makes law something other than sociology, medi-
cine, or economics is not going away. Other distinctions, however, 
do face the prospect of diminishment in the legal academy’s upcom-
ing years and decades, especially given the faded financial inde-
pendence of law schools.91 It is beyond the scope of this Article to 
analyze or opine upon the relative desirability of the breakdown of 
all aspects of law school exceptionalism. To be sure, not every dis-
tinction will break down in what remains a distinctive field. None-
theless, unresolved contradictions have been inherent in the trans-
formation of law schools into the legal academy by virtue of their 
naturalization as citizens of the university. To some degree, the mat-
ters that are unresolved are coming ripe for resolution. One positive 
and appropriate means of resolution of these contradictions is by law 
schools’ robust adoption of non-J.D. master’s-level graduate educa-
tion, as discussed in the following Part. 
II.  TOWARD AN EXPANDED PUBLIC MISSION 
Roughly two decades into the twenty-first century, legal educa-
tion stands at a crossroads for defining its future public educational 
mission.92 Will law school be lawyer school, or will it be something 
                                                                                                             
 90 Robert K. Rasmussen, Law Schools and the University, 66 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 451, 453 (2016). 
 91 See Yellen, supra note 91, at 528 (“If the financial outlook of legal educa-
tion does improve, universities will look to recoup some of the losses they have 
suffered while supporting their law schools during the crisis.”); Eric A. Chiappi-
nelli, Just Like Pulling Teeth: How Dental Education’s Crisis Shows the Way 
Forward for Law Schools, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 7 (2017) (“A great many 
law schools connected with universities clearly face similar problems but are able 
to conceal those problems from the public because the central university quietly 
covers the law school’s revenue shortfall.”). 
 92 By use of the term “public educational mission,” I intentionally focus this 
Article on the teaching role of law schools and not on their role in facilitating and 
producing legal scholarship. While I am a firm believer in the value of legal schol-
arship, the debates over that point are outside of the scope and purpose of this 
article and are robustly covered elsewhere. See generally Ray Worthy Campbell, 
A Comparative Look at Lawyer Professionalism: Contrasting Search Engine Op-
timization, Lawyering, & Law Teaching, 50 U.S.F. L. REV. 401, 425–26 nn.58–
60 (2016) (“At present, the value of legal scholarship is under attack both from 
within and without the legal academy. Law professors have noted that, even in an 
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broader than that? This Section advocates the broader mission as a 
normatively desirable development in a participatory liberal democ-
racy, and further posits that non-lawyer master’s degrees are the key 
present step toward advancing that development.93 The sustained 
turbulence in J.D. applications and matriculation over the last dec-
ade94 has set the stage for a “master’s-degree moment” in legal ed-
ucation.95 Law schools have unavoidable systemic financial incen-
tives to do what they should be doing anyway—facilitating more 
widespread public access to law. The well-known political maxim 
is appropriate for legal education at this time: “Never let a crisis go 
to waste.”96 The fiscal pressures encouraging law schools to venture 
outside of longstanding practices ultimately means that useful 
change has a greater chance for success. The concept of a non-J.D. 
public mission for law schools is, despite its innovative and disrup-
tive qualities, actually within the well-established aspirational goals 
of law schools as facilitators of public good. Not only is the 
M. Jur./J.M./M.L.S. concept not a distraction from the public mis-
sion of law schools, but these degrees are actually a fulfillment of 
that mission in its ultimate sense. 
The most significant normative justification for the Master of 
Jurisprudence degree (and its J.M. and M.L.S. cohorts) rests on the 
nature of law itself in a liberal democracy. Lawyers are necessary 
and beneficial in facilitating the operation of the legal system, but 
lawyers do not “own” the law in any real sense. Instead, the law 
ultimately belongs to the populace upon whom it imposes its duties 
                                                                                                             
academic field that is notoriously footnote mad, around half of all legal scholar-
ship never gets cited by anyone. Others inside the academy have questioned the 
cost. The sitting Chief Justice of the United States has mocked the value of law 
review scholarship.”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 93 See Rasmussen, supra note 90, at 461–62 (“Just as lawyers need to under-
stand the cognate professions to operate more effectively, the other professions 
need to understand the law. Law schools that do not see the value of law to non-
lawyers sell themselves short. Law increasingly intrudes into everyday life on 
multiple fronts.”). 
 94 Moliterno, supra note 2, at 1072. 
 95 See sources cited supra notes 24–27. 
 96 Benjamin H. Barton, The Lawyer’s Monopoly—What Goes and What 
Stays, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3067, 3083 (2014) (attributing the most famous re-
cent use of the phrase to then-candidate Barack Obama’s campaign advisor, Rahm 
Emanuel, speaking of the 2008 financial meltdown that sparked the Great Reces-
sion). 
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and obligations.97 Historically, however, law schools have tended to 
define their principal service to the public in terms of creating law-
yers who would themselves engage in societally-beneficial activi-
ties.98 The lawyers, in turn, would be on the front line of facilitating 
the legal system’s operation by skilled and informed representation 
of clients.99 While that perspective on lawyer production as public 
service is not wrong, it is cramped and dated in its restrictiveness. 
Law has continued to grow in complexity,100 even concurrently with 
the last decade’s decline in the job market for lawyers.101 Much of 
that decline was attributable, whether directly or indirectly, to 
growth in technologies that replaced or automated many bread-and-
butter tasks previously handled by lawyers.102 Those same techno-
logical trends, however, also empower informed laypersons in legal 
compliance.103 
Law schools, while continuing to prepare lawyers to counsel and 
represent clients (and indeed to do so at increasingly high levels of 
expertise), should also embrace the role of facilitating legal compli-
ance by the lay public. Non-lawyer master’s degree programs are 
not merely a new function for legal education in the United States, 
but actually a logical advancement of its existing functions. They 
are also consistent with the public-service concept of the American 
universities104 in which most domestic law schools are now housed. 
                                                                                                             
 97 See Judy Perry Martinez, How Lawyers and Judges Can Help Rebuild Pub-
lic Trust and Confidence in Our Justice System, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 9, 2018, 6:00 
AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/how_law-
yers_and_judges_can_help_rebuild_public_trust_and_confidence (emphasizing 
that “justice belongs to the people.”). 
 98 See, e.g., Robert Post, Leadership in Educational Institutions: Reflections 
of a Law School Dean, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1817, 1818–19 (2017) (observing that 
“legal educators were informed during the recent crisis that there was agreement 
that ‘the basic purpose of law schools is to train lawyers’”). 
 99 Id. 
 100 Hanson, supra note 68, at 563. 
 101 Moliterno, supra note 2, at 1072. 
 102 Hanson, supra note 68, at 563 (2002) (determining in 2002 that “the up-
heaval in the management of legal information has produced a number of funda-
mental transformations in the process and products of legal research and, indeed, 
in the structure and practice of the law itself.”). 
 103 Id. at 593. 
 104 Accord Mission, AAUP: AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS, 
https://www.aaup.org/about/mission-1 (last visited Oct. 25, 2019) (stating a pur-
pose across all university members “to ensure higher education’s contribution to 
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To be sure, post-Langdell legal education in the United States 
has tended to conceive of itself in narrow terms, even when espous-
ing admirable aspirations of service to the broader public. In that 
vein, Roscoe Pound’s 1951 remarks at the dedication of the new 
University of California, Los Angeles law school building (which 
would contain the young law school that Pound had joined as a 
member of faculty after his Harvard deanship)105 are representative: 
[T]o teach law in the grand manner means . . . to 
raise up lawyers as conscious members of a profes-
sion; as members of an organized body of men pur-
suing a common calling as a learned art in the spirit 
of a public service—no less a public service because 
it is incidentally and so only secondarily a means of 
livelihood. 
. . . . 
There is no way of learning a field of the law like 
teaching it to well-educated students such as alone 
are now admitted to study in accredited American 
law schools. 
. . . . 
I submit that a duty is cast upon the faculty of the law 
school of a state university, both as members of the 
teaching profession and as members of the legal pro-
fession, to exercise the learned arts they pursue in 
the spirit of a public service in the great and needed 
                                                                                                             
the common good.”). The typical U.S. law schools’ mission statement explicitly 
includes a public service component, as well. See also Margaret Martin Barry, et 
al., Justice Education and the Evaluation Process: Crossing Borders, 28 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 195, 203 n.22 (2008) (collecting law school mission statement 
sources). 
 105 See Rachel F. Moran, Clark Kerr and Me: The Future of the Public Law 
School, 88 IND. L.J. 1021, 1025 (2013) (describing the context of Dean Pound’s 
UCLA remarks). 
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service of taking upon themselves the role of a Min-
istry of Justice.106 
Here, Pound touches on two streams of law school public ser-
vice. Both streams are important, but for legal education on the cusp 
of the 2020s decade, one of the streams is narrow and diminishing 
while the second has breadth and momentum for growth. The first 
stream, represented in his reference to “public service” by law 
schools,107 is implicit and indirect. The street-level and direct public 
service he references is performed, not by the school itself, but by 
the “well-educated students such as alone” law schools train into the 
profession.108 Note that such service, while impactful, is inherently 
elite in nature, with lawyers effectively acting as a buffer between 
the law school and the general public whom the law school serves, 
albeit indirectly. Pound’s second reference to “the spirit of public 
service,” in contrast, is broad and direct, referring to public service 
performed by the law school directly through its faculty.109 They 
engage in the “great and needed service” that Pound characterized 
as “the role of a Ministry of Justice.”110 Advocacy of a “ministry of 
justice” in American law actually was articulated four decades ear-
lier with Benjamin Cardozo’s concern about the need to improve 
communications between courts and legislatures.111 This Article, in 
contrast, concerns itself with Pound’s formulation because he ad-
vanced law schools (acting through their law faculty) as the means 
for improving the function of public governance. 
This “Ministry of Justice” concept promoted by Pound is rele-
vant and explanatory here because it is at the headwaters of a law 
school mission that is separate from training lawyers. This “other” 
mission is the function of law schools mediating a gap between law 
                                                                                                             
 106 Roscoe Pound, A Ministry of Justice: A New Role for the Law School, 38 
A.B.A. J. 637, 637, 705 (1952) (emphasis added). 
 107 Id. at 637. 
 108 Id. at 705 (emphasis added). 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 See Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 
114 (1921) (“This task of mediation is that of a ministry of justice. The duty must 
be cast on some man or group of men to watch the law in action, observe the 
manner of its functioning, and report the changes needed when function is de-
ranged. The thought is not a new one. Among our own scholars, it has been de-
veloped by Dean Pound with fertility and power.”). 
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and legal institutions on the one hand, and the governed public on 
the other.112 Pound’s 1951 address was focused on faculty service 
to public institutions rather than directly to the public served by 
those institutions.113 The advancement of diverse public interests 
through institutions that fit within the notion of a ministry of justice 
frequently does involve law faculty aiding public institutions. On 
matters of statutory revision and reform, for example, the Uniform 
Law Commission (“ULC”) primarily navigates public policy mat-
ters—not directly with the public—but with the public’s elected rep-
resentatives in state legislatures.114 For another example, the Amer-
ican Law Institute (“ALI”), whose members were and are drafters 
of the influential restatements of the law, 115 has expressly been 
identified as advancing the mission of a ministry of justice.116 Legal 
academics do indeed play substantial roles in the law reform efforts 
of both the ULC117 and the ALI.118 Such activities are certainly 
within the public service contemplated by Pound. While the public 
benefits from these organizations’ efforts, the ULC and ALI do not 
reach the public directly. 
Non-lawyer master’s programs—innovations that Pound cer-
tainly did not envision in 1951—are nonetheless consistent with and 
a fulfillment of the larger goal of the “Ministry of Justice” law 
school. These degrees directly reach the public by mediating the gap 
                                                                                                             
 112 Pound, supra note 106 at 637. 
 113 Id. at at 640–41. 
 114 The ULC is historically also known as the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws. See Overview: About Us, UNIF. L. COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/overview (stating that the ULC “provides 
states with non-partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted legislation that brings 
clarity and stability to critical areas of state statutory law.”). 
 115 See American Law Institute, About ALI, A.L.I., https://www.ali.org/about-
ali/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (stating that ALI’s “distinguished members have 
the opportunity to influence the development of the law in both existing and 
emerging areas, to work with other eminent lawyers, judges, and academics, to 
give back to a profession to which they are deeply dedicated, and to contribute to 
the public good.”). 
 116 See Kristen David Adams, The American Law Institute: Justice Cardozo’s 
Ministry of Justice?, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 173, 200 (2007) (“At least three other au-
thors have raised the possibility of a comparison between the American Law In-
stitute and Justice Cardozo’s Ministry of Justice, but none of these have fully ex-
plored the contours of such a comparison.”). 
 117 UNIF. LAW COMM’N, supra note 114. 
 118 American Law Institute, supra note 115. 
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between law and those it governs. The principal difference is that 
they approach the task from the side of the public rather than from 
the side of legal institutions. Bringing the law directly to the public 
is not part of the traditional task in which law schools have engaged 
themselves over the last century,119 but doing so improves the ser-
vice of legal systems to the public. Rather than simplifying, system-
atizing, or otherwise making sense of the law itself—roles typified 
by the ULC and ALI—non-lawyer education better empowers the 
public itself to navigate the law as it stands. Empowering the public 
is, in many respects, the ultimate fulfillment of legal education as a 
public service. 
The public service provided by extending legal education be-
yond the realm of training future lawyers also has a basis apart from 
the law school mission; it is consistent with the American concept 
of a university, a concept that differs substantially from its medieval 
European origins because of the impact of the creation of land-grant 
universities starting in 1862.120 
Land-grant universities bear that name from being financial ben-
eficiaries of grants of federal land to the states for the purpose of 
funding institutions of higher education.121 Congressman Justin S. 
Morrill sponsored the land-grant concept that bears his name as the 
Morrill Act,122 which sought an extension of public higher education 
that “aimed at the widest possible dissemination of learning.”123 
Many universities already existed in the United States, but their fo-
cus tended to be more elite, consistent with the European origins.124 
Both Representative Morrill and President Abraham Lincoln saw 
                                                                                                             
 119 Post, supra note 98, at 1818–19. 
 120 6 KELLOGG COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF STATE & LAND-GRANT UNIVS., 
RENEWING THE COVENANT: LEARNING, DISCOVERY, AND ENGAGEMENTS IN A 
NEW AGE AND DIFFERENT WORLD 26 (2000) [hereinafter KELLOGG COMM’N], 
http://www.aplu.org/library/renewing-the-covenant-learning-discovery-and-en-
gagement-in-a-new-age-and-different-world/file. 
 121 Land grant colleges and universities now exist in every state, and my home 
institution, Texas A&M University, is by way of example, the oldest land-grant 
university in the state of Texas. See The Morrill Act, Explained, TEXAS A&M 
TODAY (July 1, 2018) https://today.tamu.edu/2018/07/01/the-morrill-act-ex-
plained/. 
 122 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (2012). 
 123 Rex R. Perschbacher, The Public Responsibilities of a Public Law School, 
31 U. TOL. L. REV. 693, 694 (2000). 
 124 Moran, supra note 105, at 1. 
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proposed land-grant universities as different, as they affirmatively 
were “the public’s universities.”125 Their focus explicitly included 
practical education, described by Morrill as an “opportunity in every 
State for a liberal and larger education to larger numbers, not merely 
to those destined to sedentary professions, but to those needing 
higher instruction for the world’s business, for the industrial pursuits 
and professions of life.”126 In other words, land-grant schools would 
emphasize practical education, with the explicit goal of bringing it 
to the public at large.127 
The impact of the original Morrill Act on shaping higher educa-
tion in the United States cannot be over-emphasized, as it estab-
lished the ethos in which programs like the post-World War II Ser-
vicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, better known as the G.I. Bill, 
were not only possible but were broadly supported.128 American 
higher education, while still firmly committed to the traditional lib-
eral arts, nonetheless has a distinctive practical streak that encom-
passes empowering the public.129 On the cusp of the twenty-first 
century, the Kellogg Commission on the Future of State and Land 
Grant Universities articulated this goal as being the facilitation of 
“[l]earning environments that meet the civic ends of public higher 
education by preparing students to lead and participate in a demo-
cratic society.” 130 While distinctions still exist between public and 
                                                                                                             
 125 Perschbacher, supra note 123, at 694. 
 126 S. RES. 502, 112TH CONG., 2D SESS., 158 Cong. Rec. S4374-02, S4374 
(2012) (quoting Representative Morrill in commemoration of the 150th anniver-
sary of passage of the Morrill Act). 
 127 James O. Freedman, Liberal Education and the Legal Profession, 39 SW. 
L.J. 741, 745 (1985) (“Rather than perpetuating an elite of gentlemen-scholars, 
the Morrill Act called into being a new kind of university, created without Euro-
pean precedents, hospitable to all comers, and designed to prepare Americans to 
be Americans. The land-grant university opened the pursuit of excellence to farm-
ers’ children, artisans’ children, and storekeepers’ children.”). 
 128 See Omari Scott Simmons, Class Dismissed: Rethinking Socio-Economic 
Status and Higher Education, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 231, 266-67 (2014) (“Nonetheless, 
the G.I. Bill had an unprecedented transformative impact on higher education ac-
cess and social advancement in the United States. The G.I. Bill democratized 
higher education and home ownership, which ultimately led to a post-war expan-
sion of the middle class and the flattening of class hierarchies.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 129 KELLOGG COMM’N, supra note 120, at 15. 
 130 Id. at 10. 
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private university education, these differences have eroded signifi-
cantly in the century-and-a-half since the Morrill Act put into mo-
tion “a growing convergence between all public and private institu-
tions.”131 Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find either a private 
university or private law school in the United States that explicitly 
denies having a mission of public service to a broad public.132 In 
many respects, in American higher education, we are all land-grant 
schools now. 
Both the law school and the university in the United States have 
a longstanding mission of public service grounded in their history 
and in the traditions arising in a democratic society. Roscoe Pound’s 
formulation of law schools’ role as a “Ministry of Justice” has, at its 
heart, the goal of bridging the disconnect between the governed pub-
lic on one side and law and its instrumentalities on the other.133 
While Pound (and legal education generally) envisioned this bridg-
ing role as being accomplished on the legal institutional side,134 a 
bridge runs two ways. The public is empowered to better and more 
effectively navigate law through access to legal education of the sort 
now offered by non-lawyer master’s programs. 
Moreover, the offering of such degrees is consistent with the 
Morrill Act’s vision of profoundly public universities that recon-
ceived higher education with a role that includes, rather than ex-
cludes, the teaching of practical knowledge.135 While not all are law-
yers, all will engage with the law. Instruction in the means of effec-
tive engagement is in furtherance of the public and practical land-
grant mission.136 That mission, in its most fundamental sense, is no 
longer exclusive to land-grant universities or even to public univer-
sities.137 With this history and in this environment, law schools are 
well-justified in offering new master’s degrees. Far from being a 
source of distraction, these degrees further the institutional mission. 
                                                                                                             
 131 Richard A. Matasar, Private Publics, Public Privates: An Essay on Con-
vergence in Higher Education, 10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 9 (1998). 
 132 See, e.g., Mission, supra note 104. 
 133 Pound, supra note 106, at 637. 
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 135 Freedman, supra note 85, at 745. 
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III.  EXECUTING THE EXPANDED PUBLIC MISSION 
Furthering law school and university institutional missions 
through new programs presupposes that the programs are well-de-
signed for their goals. The principal commonality among the new 
breed of legal master’s degrees in the United States is that they are 
targeted at non-lawyers who do not intend to become lawyers.138 
The endgame for students in an M. Jur. program is not licensure to 
practice law but rather the ability to operate skillfully and knowl-
edgeably in and around the law.139 The key differentiation in pro-
grammatic and course design for an M. Jur. program, as compared 
to a J.D. program, is that the goal of the former is not to facilitate a 
change of career but instead to enhance an existing career.140 This 
foundational fact is a game changer for how law schools should 
teach master’s courses. A student who does not intend to represent 
clients needs different information than one who does, and many 
justifications for why law schools do things a certain way will, upon 
reflection, fall by the wayside in a master’s setting. Programmatic 
goals are different, grading should be different, and pedagogy 
should be different, especially in view of the lack of a bar examina-
tion following receipt of the degree.141 
The typical enrollee in a J.D. program, of course, intends to pass 
the bar exam and represent clients.142 Likewise, the typical student 
in an LL.M. program is already a lawyer, albeit sometimes one 
                                                                                                             
 138 See Joni Hersch, Increasing Diversity by a New Master’s Degree in Legal 
Principles, 67 J. LEGAL EDUC. 86, 100–01 (2017). 
 139 Id. at 101. 
 140 Id. 
 141 See id. at 100–01. 
 142 See Sabrina DeFabritiis, 1L Is the New Bar Prep, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
37, 39 (2017) (recognizing that course design around bar passage is sanctioned by 
ABA Standard 301(a), “which provides that the new goal of legal education is to 
prepare ‘its students, upon graduation, for admission to the bar and for effective, 
ethical, and responsible participation as a member of the legal profession.’”). See 
AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF 
LAW SCHOOLS 2018-2019, at 15 (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/con-
tent/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2018-2019ABAS-
tandardsforApprovalofLawSchools/2018-2019-aba-standards-rules-approval-
law-schools-final.pdf [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE]. 
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whose prior education and licensure was in a non-U.S. jurisdic-
tion.143 In both instances, the identity of the law student is inextrica-
bly intertwined with the legal profession.144 This identity is mani-
fested either in the goal of becoming a lawyer (J.D.) or in expanding 
the realm in which one operates as a lawyer, whether geographically 
or in expanding subject-matter experience and expertise (LL.M.).145 
The new legal master’s degrees, in contrast, do not portend entry 
into or advancement within the legal profession.146 This founda-
tional difference is not trivial, and it calls for an imagining of pro-
gram design from the ground up. Most importantly, it cautions 
against the easiest and, facially, most cost-effective method of 
launching this degree—dropping master’s students into existing J.D. 
courses.147 
While master’s and J.D. students can benefit from interaction 
with one another, an instructor who is not mindful of her two diver-
gent student populations risks educational malpractice,148 and the 
students who are injured will almost certainly be on the master’s 
side. Such an outcome harms not only the students themselves in the 
                                                                                                             
 143 See Carole Silver, States Side Story: Career Paths of International LL.M. 
Students, or “I Like to Be in America”, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2383, 2384 (2012) 
(“For most international students, the typical U.S. law school path is through a 
one-year course of study leading to an LL.M. degree. Students earn their first de-
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 144 See Mary C. Daly, The Structure of Legal Education and the Legal Profes-
sion, Multidisciplinary Practice, Competition, and Globalization, 52 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 480, 481 (2002) (“Legal education and the legal profession are inextricably 
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 145 See DeFabritiis, supra note 142, at 38–39; see also Silver, supra note 143, 
at 2384. 
 146 See Hersch, supra note 138, at 90 (recognizing that “master’s degrees for 
nonlawyers” are both outside the legal profession and tend to be terminal in na-
ture). 
 147 See, e.g., Master of Legal Studies Program, supra note 19 (advertising that 
Master of Legal Studies students may take nearly “all of the courses taught at the 
Willamette University College of Law”). 
 148 My use of the term “educational malpractice” here is metaphorical and 
meant to describe inapt delivery of a course of study. Others have used the term 
quite literally, recommending the existence of tort liability, a result I certainly do 
not mean to suggest. See Stijepko Tokic, Rethinking Educational Malpractice: 
Are Educators Rock Stars?, 2014 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 105, 124–29. 
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short term, but it also harms the law school and its master’s program 
in the long term. Effectively reaching and serving an adult profes-
sional audience whose aspirations do not include practicing law or 
representing clients calls for a substantial rethinking of traditional 
legal education in areas ranging from top-level programmatic learn-
ing outcomes to the design of individual courses. Notwithstanding 
the potential benefits of the blended approach, my experience teach-
ing under both approaches has persuaded me that, where feasible, 
separate master’s classes offer a significant suite of educational ben-
efits for the student. The needs of a group of master’s students are 
objectively different than those of a group of J.D. students.149 
Regardless of the program format, however, this Section identi-
fies some key identity and process implications for law schools ac-
cepting the expanded public mission. Teaching law to professionals 
whose goals are not law licensure and law practice is a game changer 
for both the law schools and their new population of students. 
A.  Degree Program Learning Outcomes 
Programmatic learning outcomes have become ubiquitous in le-
gal education during the last decade, particularly following their for-
mal adoption into the American Bar Association (“ABA”) accredi-
tation standards for law schools in August 2014.150 Regional accred-
iting bodies have pushed for the assessment of learning outcomes at 
the university level well before that,151 so the ABA standards were 
more at the tail end of the trend than at its leading edge. Nonetheless, 
                                                                                                             
 149 See Hersch, supra note 138, at 100–01. 
 150 AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, 
EXPLANATION OF CHANGES 6–11 (2014), https://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/coun-
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C. Bahls, Adoption of Student Learning Outcomes: Lessons for Systemic Change 
in Legal Education, 67 J. LEGAL EDUC. 376, 377 (2018) (“The formal process of 
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 151 Bahls, supra note 150 at 406 (“[S]tarting in the late 1990s, regional accred-
itation organizations ‘have all moved from an input-based, prescriptive system of 
accreditation to an outcome-based system of accreditation.’ While law schools 
could once ‘fly beneath’ the regional accreditation radar screen, they increasingly 
were no longer able to do so.) (quoting CATHERINE L. CARPENTER ET AL., REPORT 
OF THE OUTCOME MEASURES COMMITTEE 47 (2008)). 
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the idea of learning outcomes is by now substantially entrenched in 
law schools, but the particular implementations advocated based 
upon ABA standards is ultimately a nonstarter for the new master’s 
programs.152 The ABA standards, unsurprisingly, are tied to the goal 
of students becoming lawyers.153 Suggested assessment methods for 
law schools have included bar exam passage rates, job placement in 
J.D.-required and J.D.-advantaged positions, and surveys of attor-
neys and judges in relevant legal communities served by the 
school.154 On their face, these measurements are substantially irrel-
evant to the career paths of professionals who are not lawyers. Legal 
master’s degree students are obtaining advanced knowledge, but 
they are not preparing for licensed entry into the legal profession.155 
This distinction is actually a strength of the master’s degree ap-
proach. For example, the Texas A&M Master of Jurisprudence pro-
gram in San Antonio has been designed for access by working pro-
fessionals.156 Thus, the typical criticism that general legal education 
offers nothing “that prepares a young law graduate for a career as a 
corporate executive, an investment banker, a management consult-
ant, or an entrepreneur” is turned on its head.157 Law school master’s 
programs are bringing the law component to those who are already 
executives, bankers, consultants, and entrepreneurs.158 The program 
objectives for non-lawyer master’s degrees should thus be posi-
tioned to build on the strengths of what legal education does, rather 
than to backfill something it does not do. 
                                                                                                             
 152 See id. at 405. 
 153 See Judith Welch Wegner, Law School Assessment in the Context of Ac-
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Dismissal of the lawyer paradigm for program objectives raises 
the question of what objectives would be relevant. A fair starting 
point is Nora Demleiter’s observation that “[g]eneral knowledge 
about contract formation, litigation, and employment law as well as 
upper-level specialized materials should be especially suitable for 
many non-legal professionals who desire focused legal 
knowledge.”159 A master’s program should cover both general legal 
knowledge and focused legal knowledge. General knowledge infor-
mation should be addressed, essentially, as a type of literacy and 
comprehension. Other information (or “focused legal knowledge”) 
calls for higher-order learning where the learner will be capable, in 
at least some settings, of analysis and evaluation.160 
An appropriate point of division between these lower and 
higher-order learning outcomes lies in the distinction between pub-
lic law and private law.161 The well-established visualization of 
Bloom’s Taxonomy162 provides a useful model for the location of 
learning outcomes. Common illustrations of Bloom’s Taxonomy of 
higher and lower-order learning outcomes place the types in a pyra-
mid,163 with the most basic learning (such as fact memorization) at 
                                                                                                             
 159 Nora V. Demleitner, Higher Education Under Pressure: What Will the Fu-
ture Hold?, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 649, 666 (2016). 
 160 But see Lucia Ann Silecchia, Legal Skills Training in the First Year of Law 
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1956)). 
 163 Yes, the graph has only two dimensions and is technically a triangle, not a 
pyramid. The construct is nonetheless most frequently described as a pyramid, a 
convention followed in this article. See, e.g., Joni Larson, Getting Up to Speed: 
Understanding the Connection Between Learning Outcomes and Assessments in 
a Doctrinal Course, 62 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 11, 26 (2017-2018) (describing use 
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As a general matter, public law material will tend toward the 
lower-order, seeking outcomes of remembering and understanding 
knowledge, with occasional bouts of application when law intersects 
with compliance. As to public law, contextual understanding is suf-
ficient and appropriate for the non-lawyer.165 A legally-literate pro-
fessional should, for example, be generally aware of how litigation 
operates, even though the actual shepherding of litigation falls to 
licensed attorneys who operate as officers of the court.166 In con-
trast, specialized courses beyond contextual basics should skew 
more heavily to the operation of private law. Why? The simple an-
swer is that non-lawyers have considerably more responsibility and 
autonomy in matters of private ordering. They do not represent the 
private parties; rather they are the private parties. As such, they have 
great autonomy over their own business affairs, with or without the 
                                                                                                             
of Bloom’s taxonomy in a law school course as a means of “moving students from 
the bottom of the skills pyramid to the top over the semester’s term.”). 
 164 Bnummer, File:Blooms-pyramid.png, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS (July 7, 
2016, 3:49 PM), https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Blooms-pyramid.png. 
 165 See Hersch, supra note 138, at 101. 
 166 See id. 
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benefit of outside counsel.167 Much of modern contract law is prem-
ised upon rules of formation168 and construction169 that neither con-
template nor require the presence of lawyers. In sum, the study of 
public law should be foundational, but the study of private law 
should ultimately have primacy. Learning outcomes for private law 
topics should tend to aim higher on the pyramid, with much rising 
to the level of application but frequently calling for analysis, syn-
thesis, and evaluation. 
In the public law arena, non-lawyer master’s programs in the 
United States typically should include learning outcomes that one 
might classify as “legal literacy.”170 Examples of these include the 
following: 
 
 Graduates will have a foundational working 
knowledge of the operation of adjudicatory legal 
institutions, particularly courts and their private 
alternatives; 
 Graduates will be able to identify the general 
common-law, statutory, and regulatory sources 
of legal duties imposed by public law regimes, 
such as tort law and criminal law; 
 Graduates will recognize the compliance obliga-
tions of natural and institutional actors to public 
                                                                                                             
 167 Alvin M. Podboy, The Shifting Sands of Legal Research: Power to the Peo-
ple, 31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1167, 1193 (2000) (“The average citizen-client can 
now find the law. She has access to the cases, statutes, and regulations that rule 
her life . . . .An informed client is a better client. She gives her advocate a clearer 
focus and a better definition of the result required.”). 
 168 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) 
(providing for formation of a contract for the sale of goods based upon the parties’ 
conduct where their writings defy contract formation in and of themselves). 
 169 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-202 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) 
(permitting explanation or supplementation of contracts for the sale of goods 
based upon the parties’ course of performance and course of dealing). 
 170 Special thanks here to Jennifer Romig for introducing me to the “legal lit-
eracy” terminology and the richness of its implications for legal master’s pro-
grams. The term became a cornerstone of a text we co-authored for legal master’s 
students. See JENNIFER MURPHY ROMIG & MARK EDWIN BURGE, LEGAL 
LITERACY AND COMMUNICATIONS SKILLS: WORKING WITH LAW AND LAWYERS 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 1–11) (on file with author). 
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law, as well as general means of enforcement of 
compliance; and 
 Graduates will recognize activities that clearly 
constitute the practice of law, along with the need 
to avoid the unauthorized practice of law. 
 
The first two of these public-law oriented program objectives 
require that a master’s program cover much information that would 
appear at the beginning of a first-year J.D. curriculum, such as the 
structure of court systems and the nominal hierarchy of legal author-
ity.171 The outcomes are heavily embedded in the realm of 
knowledge and understanding—unsurprising for foundational ma-
terial.172 The coverage could (and, for many programs, should) be 
more contextual in nature. Rather than re-creating full courses in 
torts, criminal law, and civil procedure, for example, a program 
might simply emphasize the existence, boundaries, and general role 
of these fields of law.173 
The third of the above objectives straddles the line between un-
derstanding and application, requiring a grasp not only of the fact 
that law requires a response but also the ability to formulate a re-
sponse; that is, a recognition of the duty to comply that is combined 
with the skill to chart a path in fulfillment of the duty.174 For mas-
ter’s-program skeptics concerned that such application ventures too 
close to the practice of law,175 my response is that the law itself re-
quires compliance by its subjects without regard to the availability 
of legal counsel.176 Empowering such compliance can hardly be an 
illicit act. Indeed, recognition of when one should obtain legal coun-
sel when serious matters arise is a significant benefit to achieving 
                                                                                                             
 171 Id. at 19–23. 
 172 Id. at 19. 
 173 Id. at 21–23. 
 174 See id. at 42–43. 
 175 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 176 The popular truism that no one is above the law has been stated in many 
forms. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (“No man in this 
country is so high that he is above the law.”); Theodore Roosevelt, Third Annual 
Message (Dec. 7, 1903), quoted in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 576 
(Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992) (“No man is above the law and no man is below 
it; nor do we ask any man’s permission when we require him to obey it.”). 
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this learning outcome.177 Tied to this concern, quite naturally, is the 
fourth learning outcome. Anyone dealing with law at the level of 
depth contemplated by a master’s program needs a working under-
standing of areas clearly demarcated as the practice of law.178 The 
“clearly” qualifier attached to the concept of “the practice of law” is 
important in this instance. The definition of what precisely consti-
tutes the practice of law is notoriously murky,179 but clarity does 
exist on the margins, in areas such as representing clients in legal 
proceedings and providing legal advice to others.180 Professionals 
outside of the licensed bar should be aware of both the clear prohi-
bitions and the existence of hazy areas. 
The private law learning outcomes for master’s programs are 
trickier insofar as the range of possible topics is as diverse as the 
range of potential constructs for private ordering.181 Both are con-
ceivably infinite. Nonetheless, examples of private law foundational 
learning outcomes illustrate the form and possibilities of program 
                                                                                                             
 177 See Podboy, supra note 167, at 1194. 
 178 ROMIG & BURGE, supra note 170, at 43–44. 
 179 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode & Benjamin H. Barton, Rethinking Self-Reg-
ulation: Antitrust Perspectives on Bar Governance Activity, 20 CHAP. L. REV. 
267, 269 (2017) (“Despite forty years of UPL research and critique, the bar has 
continued to offer vague and expansive definitions of the practice of law . . . .”); 
Thomas E. Spahn, Is Your Artificial Intelligence Guilty of the Unauthorized Prac-
tice of Law?, 24 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 28 (2018) (observing that “practice of law” 
has an “uncertain definition”); Victor Li, Talk to Me: Issues Papers Seeking Feed-
back on How Legal Services Are Regulated Prompt Lots of Comments but Little 
Consensus, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2016, at 65, 66 (reporting a determination by the ABA 
Commission on the Future of the Legal Profession that “defining the practice of 
law, and by extension, what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law, is ‘ex-
tremely difficult’ and that individual state definitions are ‘notoriously vague and 
circular.’”). 
 180 Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An 
Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581, 2588 
(1999) (“UPL statutes usually proscribe three broad categories of activity: (1) rep-
resenting another in a judicial or administrative proceeding; (2) preparing legal 
instruments or documents which affect the legal rights of another; and (3) advising 
another of their legal rights and responsibilities.”). 
 181 See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (lauding “the peculiar genius 
of private-law systems in general-flexibility in ordering private rights and obliga-
tions to reflect the intentions of the parties.”); Michael A. Helfand & Barak D. 
Richman, The Challenge of Co-Religionist Commerce, 64 DUKE L.J. 769, 780 
(2015) (asserting that private law “empowers parties to adjust to legal parameters 
and craft their dealings within the shadow of the law.”). 
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design. Private law programmatic learning outcomes might include 
some of the following: 
 
 Graduates will be able to recognize and explain 
the role of private ordering in creating legal enti-
ties and organizational regimes; 
 Graduates will be able to synthesize legally sig-
nificant events in discrete doctrinal areas at the 
level of an informed client to identify issues in 
those areas that are worthy of further investiga-
tion or consultation with an attorney; 
 Graduates will recognize and be able to analyze 
of the impact of common terms within one or 
more categories of transactional documents; and 
 Graduates will be able to articulate and justify so-
lutions to problems in contract law at a level suf-
ficient to communicate them to both lawyers and 
internal organization management with a high 
degree of accuracy. 
 
These learning outcomes reflect the greater depth of activity on 
the side of private law that, while including significant overlap into 
functions often handled by lawyers, nonetheless remains in the 
realm appropriate to the non-lawyer client in a professional setting. 
The first of these sample learning outcomes for non-lawyer mas-
ter’s programs is still at the low end of the Bloom’s Taxonomy pyr-
amid, but it represents the acquisition of important baseline 
knowledge. A program geared toward private and autonomous ac-
tors requires achieving an understanding of where and how private 
ordering occurs.182 Courses with the typical coverage of law school 
courses in contracts and business organizations advance this under-
standing across the board183 and would appropriately be corner-
stones of understanding the means and methods of private ordering 
of transactions and entities. 
                                                                                                             
 182 See generally ROMIG & BURGE, supra note 170, at 49–106 (teaching foun-
dational recognition and synthesis skills). 
 183 See Mark Edwin Burge, Too Clever by Half: Reflections on Perception, 
Legitimacy, and Choice of Law Under Revised Article 1 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 357, 380 (2015) (“The notion of treating 
2019] ACCESS TO LAW OR ACCESS TO LAWYERS? 181 
The second and third of these private law learning outcomes per-
haps reach closest to the work of lawyers, but they also are the most 
flexible in allowing for program specification.184 These outcomes 
involve the upper half of the pyramid, which includes application, 
analysis, and synthesis. Synthesizing the meaning of legally signif-
icant events overlap with a lawyering skill,185 but the master’s de-
gree version of it differs in a critical way. The target level of synthe-
sis is that of an “informed client,”186 not a legal specialist. The indi-
vidual benefit of this outcome is twofold. It first empowers the client 
to guide events and decisions at a granular level that tends to avoid 
legally-problematic situations.187 More simply, the knowledge facil-
itates client autonomy,188 a value clearly acknowledged by the gov-
erning rules of the legal profession.189 When achieved, this outcome 
also prepares the client to better recognize the need to call upon legal 
counsel.190 
                                                                                                             
contract law different from, say, tort or criminal law, arises from the fact that 
contracts are essentially a private ordering of transactional obligations rather than 
a matter of public interest.”). 
 184 See generally ROMIG & BURGE, supra note 170, at 233–93 (teaching trans-
actional literary skills). 
 185 See Bridget McCormack, Teaching Professionalism, 75 TENN. L. REV. 
251, 252 (2008) (“The traditional law school curriculum focuses primarily on one 
set of skills lawyers need to succeed, which is comprised exclusively of doctrinal 
analysis, synthesis, and effective argument.”). 
 186 Cf. Podboy, supra note 167 at 1193 (“The average citizen-client can now 
find the law. She has access to the cases, statutes, and regulations that rule her 
life . . . .An informed client is a better client. She gives her advocate a clearer fo-
cus and a better definition of the result required.”). 
 187 See id. at 1193. 
 188 See id. at 1193 (discussing the benefits of an informed client, such as being 
capable of accessing legal materials). 
 189 See Fred C. Zacharias, Limits on Client Autonomy in Legal Ethics Regula-
tion, 81 B.U. L. REV. 199, 199 (2001) (recognizing that legal ethics rules proceed 
“from the assumption that client autonomy is a good thing and paternalism to-
wards clients is bad.”). But see id. at 203 (noting the legal profession’s competing 
interest in minimizing “the risk that the exercise of autonomy will be self-destruc-
tive.”). 
 190 See Podboy, supra note 167, at 1194 (discussing how “[t]he volume of le-
gal resources and their complexity insures the need for sound professional advice. 
A well-informed, intelligent client will recognize the value of legal service re-
ceived.”). 
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The third of the above learning outcomes recognizes the fact that 
many transactional actors create and revise their own documents.191 
In its fundamentals, contract law operates without regard to the pres-
ence or absence of lawyers. Parties have famously created binding 
agreements with nary a lawyer in sight by scribbling terms on the 
back of a restaurant check.192 Lawyers can bring valuable deal-mak-
ing skills to the table, but much contracting and other law-related 
work occurs outside the presence of counsel.193 For lawyers and le-
gal education to pretend otherwise would be foolish. Obtaining pri-
vate-actor skill in analyzing and revising basic transactional docu-
ments is one of the most reasonable expectations that a legal mas-
ter’s program graduate can have.194 
The fourth of the above sample learning outcomes for the pro-
gram focuses on building internal-facing and external-facing com-
munications skills that facilitate successful access to the legal sys-
tem. Put another way, legal master’s graduates need the ability to 
speak and write about law in the contexts of (1) inter-organizational 
problem solving and assessment, and (2) communications with out-
side counsel who are not as informed about the business issues fac-
ing the organization as are its inside actors.195 The outcome sug-
gested here tends toward the top end of the Bloom’s Taxonomy pyr-
amid.196 Graduates should be able to synthesize a lawyer’s legal 
analysis with their own understanding of non-legal issues (e.g., fi-
nancial constraints, public relations, branding, market status, etc.) 
and use that synthesis to evaluate prospective decisions. In effect, 
the outcome seeks the existence of team members who make their 
                                                                                                             
 191 Cf. Ray Worthy Campbell, The End of Law Schools: Legal Education in 
the Era of Legal Service Businesses, 85 MISS. L.J. 1, 87 (2016) (addressing how 
consumers and businesses can complete transactions without assistance from ex-
perts). 
 192 See Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 518 (Va. 1954). 
 193 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 191, at 29 (“Interpreting and applying the 
tax code, for example, is as much the work of tax accountants as tax lawyers.”). 
 194 See generally ROMIG & BURGE, supra note 170, at 233–93. 
 195 See, e.g., Master of Studies in Law in Corporate Compliance, FORDHAM 
U. SCH. L., https://onlinelaw.fordham.edu/master-studies-law/ (last visited Oct. 
16, 2019). 
 196 See Larson, supra note 163, at 22 (explaining the top levels of the pyramid 
as engaging in “critical thinking, such as making decisions based on analysis, syn-
thesizing different elements to create something new, or applying knowledge in 
various contexts.”). 
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organizations work more effectively through the integration of legal 
and non-legal knowledge into an evaluative decision-making pro-
cess.197 This final task is no small order, but it is one worthy of care-
ful program design and improvement to achieve. 
The public law and private law program objectives described 
here are representative of how the goals of a master’s degree pro-
gram can and should differ from those of a juris doctor program. 
Most legal master’s programs will likely include significant doses 
of both public law and private law subject matter. The comparative 
engagement and autonomy of non-lawyer actors in those two broad 
realms should substantially impact the selection of programmatic 
learning outcomes.198 Public-law oriented topics should tend toward 
the lower half of Bloom’s Taxonomy pyramid because they center 
around access to legal-system instrumentalities199 where the zone of 
                                                                                                             
 197 Though not necessarily identical, the role of legal master’s students may 
have considerable overlap with employment positions identified by law schools 
as “J.D. Advantage.” See Kathleen Harrell-Latham & Daniel Spicer, Think Like a 
Lawyer, Act Like a Mogul: Tackling Practical Business Problems in a Changing 
Legal Landscape, 43 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 1014, 1019 n.18 (2017) (“J.D. 
Advantage roles include compliance analysts, contract managers, law school ad-
ministrators, and regulatory analysts, among others.”). One advantage that mas-
ter’s students have over their J.D. counterparts in this setting is the ease of avoid-
ing career misunderstanding over their individual desire to be in a non-lawyer job 
position. See id. at 1020 (acknowledging that “many lawyers encounter resistance 
from non-lawyers in charge of hiring” for a role in which a license to practice law 
is not a requirement). 
 198 See J. Lyn Entrikin & Richard K. Neumann Jr., Teaching the Art and Craft 
of Drafting Public Law: Statutes, Rules, and More, 55 DUQUESNE L. REV. 9, 33 
(2017) (“Public rules are enacted, issued, or adopted by public bodies or entities 
with authority to issue legal rules. They include electors, legislatures, judicial of-
ficers, state governors, and administrative agencies. In that respect, public rules 
differ from private law, which is negotiated by individuals or organizations to 
govern impending transactions or current and ongoing relationships.”). 
 199 See Douglas S. Eakeley, Role of the Legal Services Corporation in Pre-
serving Our National Commitment to Equal Access to Justice, 1997 ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 741, 741 (1997) (“All too often, access to a lawyer is necessary to have 
access to the courts and to justice in civil legal matters. Conversely, denial of legal 
representation often can be tantamount to denial of justice.”); Jeffrey R. Pankratz, 
Neutral Principles and the Right to Neutral Access to the Courts, 67 IND. L.J. 
1091, 1109 (1992) (“The simple fact is that today a right of access to the courts is 
meaningless without access to the services of lawyers. Our legal institutions are 
designed to be operated by lawyers, not laypersons.”). 
184 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:143 
the lawyers’ role is most expansive.200 Programmatic outcomes 
grounded in private law should tend toward the upper half of 
Bloom’s pyramid because those topics are more structurally suited 
to private actors’ engagement in areas that do not necessarily require 
the persistent involvement of lawyers,201 even though such involve-
ment can be highly beneficial.202 The sample program learning out-
comes outlined here illustrate these tendencies and, hopefully, pro-
vide insight into the value that law schools can offer master’s-
trained students by creating value that these students can bring back 
to their organizations and professions. 
B.  Principles of Master’s-Focused Course Design 
In a well-designed academic program, the overall programmatic 
objectives feed into and impact the design of individual courses.203 
Such design, in turn, is reflected in both course objectives and as-
sessment methodology.204 Master’s-only courses in law have the 
distinct advantage of being capable of top-to-bottom design with the 
goals of master’s students in mind— goals that do not involve bar 
passage or client representation.205 The challenge for mixed J.D. and 
master’s classes is that the design of most mixed courses is premised 
                                                                                                             
 200 See Larson, supra note 163, at 23 (addressing the expectations of lawyers 
in the lower level of the pyramid to “apply knowledge and skills in situations 
similar to the context in which the knowledge was learned.”). 
 201 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Law-
yering, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 498 (2007) (observing that, notwithstand-
ing the value lawyers can add, transaction costs can also effectively be reduced 
by non-lawyer advisers). 
 202 Charles Silver & Frank B. Cross, What’s Not to like About Being a Law-
yer?, 109 YALE L.J. 1443, 1491–92 (2000) (contending that clients pay lawyers to 
complete tasks that they could do on their own because lawyers “use law effi-
ciently and expertly.”). 
 203 See Ruth Jones, Assessment and Legal Education: What Is Assessment, and 
What the *# Does It Have to Do with the Challenges Facing Legal Education?, 
45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 85, 88 (2013) (asserting that “program assessment is use-
ful to assure that the students meet learning objectives in multiple courses with 
cohesive program learning objectives . . . .”). 
 204 Accord Gerald F. Hess, Collaborative Course Design: Not My Course, Not 
their Course, but Our Course, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 367, 376 (2008). 
 205 See id. at 386–87 (discussing how course design with students’ goals and 
interests in mind leads to maximized performance and motivation). 
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upon the end goal of becoming an attorney.206 While that premise 
does not necessarily make course coverage irrelevant for non-J.D. 
students, it does mean that the coverage will have a higher intellec-
tual transaction cost for these students. They will have to translate 
hypotheticals, problems, and perhaps even the Socratic method itself 
within a framework that is at variance with their own present or in-
tended professional identity. Faculty must engage in this translation 
process as well.207 Classes designed for J.D. students necessarily 
presume and speak the language of the future lawyer,208 not that of 
the future client or business professional.209 
These differences between a master of jurisprudence program 
and the lawyer-focused J.D. (and the inherently second-law-degree 
LL.M. as well) program raise a baseline structural question: should 
master’s students be taught primarily in separate classes or primarily 
alongside J.D. students? As an initial matter, both approaches have 
genuine pedagogical and institutional benefits. As of this writing, 
the more common approach, apart from some introductory courses, 
                                                                                                             
 206 Cf. Jamie L. Wershbale, Collaborative Accreditation: Securing the Future 
of Historically Black Colleges, 12 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 67, 94 
(2010) (describing in the accreditation context the necessity for an educational 
institution to “ensure that [its] courses . . . are of sufficient quality to achieve . . . 
the stated objective for which the courses or programs are offered.” (quoting 20 
U.S.C. § 1099b(a)(4)(A) (2008))). 
 207 See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Writing to Learn Law and Writing in Law: 
An Intellectual Property Illustration, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 823, 838 (2008) (“Be-
fore I accept an LL.M. or other non-J.D. student into my course, I brief the stu-
dent . . . on the character of the assessment method and my expectations.”). 
 208 The different and specialized language of law school for J.D. students is 
highly consequential, as Elizabeth Mertz has established. See, e.g., Elizabeth 
Mertz, Inside the Law School Classroom: Toward a New Legal Realist Pedagogy, 
60 VAND. L. REV. 483, 491 (2007) (recounting of J.D. students that the “first-year, 
first-semester . . . is the time period during which students experience their first 
re-orientation to language as they enter their new chosen profession.”). Masters 
students, in contrast, are neither primed nor necessarily inclined to undergo this 
“initiation rite, a time when entrants to a new social status are taught to shift old 
patterns in favor of new ones.” Id. See also ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE 
OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 4–5 (2007). 
 209 See, e.g., Shayna Joubert, Master of Legal Studies vs. Juris Doctor: Which 
is Right for You?, NE. U. GRADUATE PROGRAMS (Apr. 24, 2018), 
https://www.northeastern.edu/graduate/blog/what-is-the-difference-between-le-
gal-studies-vs-law-degree/ (“[Legal master’s programs] give students the skills to 
analyze legal matters specific to their field by examining real-world case studies 
from their industry.”). 
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is to combine the master’s and J.D. students.210 The justifications 
for the combined approach include a cross-pollination between fu-
ture lawyers and the generally more life-experienced professionals 
who may be future clients.211 The value of life experience in the 
classroom is quite real, as most professors who have taught in a part-
time evening program would attest.212 Additionally, program blend-
ing in the context of a robust J.D. curriculum should, in theory at 
least, improve the course-subject availability for the master’s stu-
dents because they could draw from a larger catalog of existing 
courses. 
The elephant in the room supporting blended design is eco-
nomic, however. Placing master’s students in J.D. classes typically 
causes the least amount of draw on expensive (and in many places, 
scarce) faculty resources.213 The marginal cost of adding five or ten 
master’s students to a 1L section of Contracts, for example, is con-
siderably less than the cost of creating a new class to teach those five 
or ten students separately.214 This Section focuses on the design of 
courses for master’s students, however, with their presence being 
the signal fact that dictates structure. Whether implemented in a 
master’s-only course or in a mixed course, design with regard to the 
presence of master’s students should be intentional, not an after-
thought. 
Like the Article as a whole, this consideration of course design 
is informed by the author’s own experiences, victories, and defeats 
on the instructional battlefield. The examples here are principally 
                                                                                                             
 210 See, e.g., I d. 
 211 Cf. Deborah Burand, Crossing Borders to Create Value: Integrating Inter-
national LL.M.’s into a Transactional Clinic, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 441, 
447 (2015) (recounting the “rewards generated by these J.D.-LL.M. student col-
laborations” where international LL.M. students take roles akin to transactional 
clients in concert with J.D. students). 
 212 See, e.g., Bonny L. Tavares & Rebecca L. Scalio, Teaching After Dark: 
Part-Time Evening Students and the First-Year Legal Research & Writing Class-
room, 17 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 65, 85 (2011) (“Generally, part-time evening 
students are older than full-time division students. This may account for the spirit 
of cooperation seen in part-time students, who tend to eschew competitiveness 
and approach law school as a shared experience.”). 
 213 Belsky, supra note 19, at 794 (noting in a cross-disciplinary context that 
“[h]aving additional [non-J.D.] students in classes usually involves only marginal 
costs.”). 
 214 Id. 
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drawn from two courses. The first of these is Contracts, a doctrinal 
staple of the J.D. curriculum215 that I have taught in three forms: the 
fully-J.D. format, the mixed J.D.-and-master’s format, and the mas-
ter’s-only format. The second course is Legal Analysis and Writing 
for Clients, a master’s-only course created as an adaptation of J.D. 
lawyering-skills and legal writing curriculum for the needs of work-
ing professionals.216 Both courses have played important roles in 
bringing me to the viewpoints expressed here regarding how mas-
ter’s students should be accounted for in course design as compared 
to their J.D. counterparts. 
The specific topical coverage of any law course can be as varied 
as the doctrine and skills encompassed by law itself. For that reason, 
I focus here on principles of master’s course design rather than 
bright-line rules. Any attempt at stating hard-and-fast requirements 
for master’s courses as compared to their J.D. counterparts is certain 
to face death by counterexample. Something will inevitably not fit 
within the rigid rules. For that reason, a principles-based ap-
proach217 is the preferable way to conceptualize course design in this 
space, recognizing that aspiration must have the flexibility to give 
way to reality. General principles are critical, however, to answering 
the specific questions faced by law school master’s programs.218 
                                                                                                             
 215 See Pether, supra note 60, at 501 (asserting that the J.D. curriculum “doc-
trinal staples of Contracts, Torts, Property, Civil Procedure . . . reifies the doctrine 
whose invention was necessitated by the battle to turn law into an intellectually 
respectable university discipline.”). 
 216 Adaptation is necessary because the fundamental purpose of the traditional 
1L course is at extreme variance with the fundamental purpose of a legal master’s 
program. See Edward D. Re, Increased Importance of Legal Writing in the Era of 
“The Vanishing Trial,” 21 TOURO L. REV. 665, 672–73 (2005) (identifying legal 
writing courses as having “a special purpose in the law school curriculum” that is 
grounded in “the preparation and training of law students for the practice of law.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 217 Reference to principles tends to be the better approach where a decision-
maker is expected to need to maximize discretion and judgment, though the down-
side is uncertainty and a lack of bright lines. Cf. Neal F. Newman, The U.S. Move 
to International Accounting Standards - A Matter of Cultural Discord - How Do 
We Reconcile?, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 835, 844 (2009) (describing the comparative 
costs and benefits of principles-based systems of financial accounting). 
 218 Judith Wegner, The Changing Course of Study: Sesquicentennial Reflec-
tions, 73 N.C. L. REV. 725, 746 (1995) (noting that the inclusion of non-J.D. stu-
dents in a course raises critical questions, including “how educational offerings 
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The following three principles, while hardly an exclusive list, state 
tendencies that will best align master’s courses with their appropri-
ate programmatic outcomes, which in turn will fulfill the expanded 
law school public mission advocated by this Article: 
(1) Focus legal text comprehension on structural le-
gal literacy. 
(2) Avoid premising problems and writing assign-
ments on simulated law practice. 
(3) Prefer practical reality over theory. 
The passages that follow address each of these principles with a 
goal of illustrating how they might look in practice. 
 
1. Focus legal text comprehension on structural legal literacy. 
 
Understanding the general meaning and structure of legal 
texts—especially cases, statutes, and regulations—is a critical goal 
for professionals who will deal with lawyers or will be the first line 
of defense for an organization’s legal compliance.219 The baseline 
level of this comprehension should be structural legal literacy—a 
broad-based ability to recognize and identify a legal text’s design 
features. For cases, this recognition would cover judicial rule state-
ments, analogies to precedent, and ultimate holdings.220 For statutes 
and regulations, the identification of elements, factors, and code-de-
fined terminology (such as statutory definitions) would likewise be 
                                                                                                             
could be designed to maximize the benefit for both traditional J.D. and non-J.D. 
students.”). 
 219 See Master of Studies in Law in Corporate Compliance, supra note 195. 
 220 Legal literacy would, however, tend to exclude the traditional lawyering 
skill of crafting predictive analysis. Cf. Mark K. Osbeck, Lawyer As Soothsayer: 
Exploring the Important Role of Outcome Prediction in the Practice of Law, 123 
PENN ST. L. REV. 41, 53 (2018) (“The principal tools lawyers have traditionally 
used to predict case outcomes are: (1) an element-focused analysis of each as-
serted cause of action and defense in the case, looking to prior decisional law to 
determine whether these elements are met; (2) lawyerly experience; and (3) cer-
tain types of empirical information that may provide insight into how a prospec-
tive judge or jury would decide the instant matter.”). 
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a core competency.221 Such parsing of legal text is an early focus of 
J.D. legal education, but from there it builds out toward more diverse 
concepts like the temporal development of common law and the dis-
cernment of legislative intent.222 For master’s students, the struc-
tural comprehension is not merely a means to other ultimate goals; 
rather, it is itself an ultimate goal. 
That distinction between being an end rather than a means to an 
end is a substantive one that impacts fundamental pedagogy. Most 
significantly, the signal, historical pedagogy of legal education—the 
Socratic method—223is ill-advised for master’s-type legal educa-
tion. As others have observed in the J.D. context, the Socratic 
method has some significant educational value,224 but it is ineffi-
cient for teaching the law.225 Indeed, the Socratic method’s purpose, 
in the apt articulation of the famous-but-fictional Professor Kings-
field, is not to teach the law, but rather to train students to think like 
                                                                                                             
 221 See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education 
and the Legal Profession, 19 MICH. L. REV. 34, 38 (1992). Statute and regulation 
reading is an example of where a legal master’s program core competency would 
appropriately overlap the coverage of a J.D. program. 
 222 Id. (discussing the importance that law students be able to “analyze, inter-
pret and apply cases, statutes, and other legal texts.”). 
 223 Abrams, supra note 30, at 565. 
 224 See, e.g., Michael Vitiello, Professor Kingsfield: The Most Misunderstood 
Character in Literature, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 984 (2005) (“Even critics of 
Kingsfield and the demanding Socratic method admit that students are better pre-
pared in a demanding environment.”) 
 225 See, e.g., David D. Garner, Socratic Misogyny?–Analyzing Feminist Criti-
cisms of Socratic Teaching in Legal Education, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1597, 1610 
(recounting that a “complaint against the Socratic method is that it is an inefficient 
way to convey large amounts of information. Indeed, the time necessary to de-
velop a point of law through Socratic dialogue creates ‘the temptation on the 
teacher’s part to revert to lecture in order to achieve “coverage,” thus falling back 
on the poorest form of learning pattern.’” (emphasis and footnote omitted) (quot-
ing Frank R. Strong, The Pedagogic Training of a Law Faculty, 25 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 226, 235 (1973))). 
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a practicing lawyer.226 While “thinking like a lawyer” is a time-hon-
ored and worthy goal in the halls of the legal academy,227 it is inap-
posite for students in a program that, by definition, is not designed 
to turn them into lawyers. 
In the master’s program setting, accordingly, the primary pur-
pose of reading a case involving contract law primarily is to learn 
the contract law—both in its abstract, black-letter sense (the rule) 
and in its applied-example sense (the immediate story of how the 
rule operates). The top-level goal is not to discern procedural nu-
ances and the murky role of dicta, nor is it to construct the historical 
development of doctrines like consideration or promissory estop-
pel.228 Consequently, the students would seldom benefit from “hide 
the ball”229 type classroom engagements as those detract from the 
principal task of top-level legal literacy. Likewise, the study of stat-
utes or regulations requires focus on navigating and discerning the 
meaning of rule texts, including integrated codes. It can rightfully 
exclude excessive focus on ambiguity, drafting errors, and legisla-
tive history. Hypotheticals directed toward teasing out absurd results 
of statutory canons may well be fun,230 but they are beside the point. 
A non-lawyer needs a working level of comfort with assimilating 
legal texts, the vast majority of which has meaning that is not in 
serious and consequential question.231 The more complex—and less 
                                                                                                             
 226 THE PAPER CHASE (Twentieth Century Fox 1973) Professor Kingsfield fa-
mously stated that students come to law school “with a skull full of mush” and 
“leave thinking like a lawyer.” Id. 
 227 See Mertz, supra note 208, at 492 (“[L]aw students are urged to give up 
old approaches to language and conflict and adopt new ones. ‘Thinking’ like a 
lawyer turns out to depend in important ways on speaking (and reading, and writ-
ing) like a lawyer.”). 
 228 See id. 
 229 See, e.g., Garner, supra note 225, at 1611 (quoting James Eagar, The Right 
Tool for the Job: The Effective Use of Pedagogical Methods in Legal Education, 
32 GONZ. L. REV. 389, 402 (1996–97)). 
 230 See generally THE PAPER CHASE, supra note 226. 
 231 Accord Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Con-
struction Distinction in Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. 530, 547–48 (2013) (“The 
linguistic meanings of legal texts are not radically indeterminate, because linguis-
tic communication works.”). 
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common—arguments over legal meaning can (and should) be 
brought to the lawyers.232 
 
2. Avoid premising problems and writing assignments on sim-
ulated law practice. 
 
Legal master’s programs typically accept the proposition that le-
gal analysis and writing are needs and provide value within the cur-
riculum.233 The value exists both where courses are primarily skills 
oriented and also where writing is a method of formative assessment 
in a principally doctrinal course.234 This noncontroversial premise 
can lead to difficulty in its execution. The baseline starting point for 
many law schools’ curriculum development in the area of analytical 
writing skills, not surprisingly, is that with which they are already 
familiar: the 1L legal research and writing course that already exists 
in some form in every ABA-accredited J.D. program in the United 
States.235 That legal analysis and writing course is quite appropri-
ately grounded in expressing the application of actual law to simu-
lated facts in a setting where students play the role of a lawyer.236 
Writing assignments in doctrinal courses, while usually not playing 
                                                                                                             
 232 See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 201, at 507 (explaining how transactional 
lawyers are secured in their professions because even though non-lawyers can 
accomplish some of the same tasks, lawyers’ expertise reduce regulatory costs 
and add value). 
 233 See, e.g., Online Master of Legal Studies, WASH. U. ST. LOUIS SCH. OF L., 
https://onlinelaw.wustl.edu/mls-degrees/online-mls/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) 
(“The skills based curriculum prepares students to draft legal documents, conduct 
legal research and analyze new laws and regulations.”). 
 234 Id. 
 235 See ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 142, at 16 
(requiring that the J.D. program of legal education at an ABA-accredited law 
school include “one writing experience in the first year and at least one additional 
writing experience after the first year, both of which are faculty supervised”). 
 236 See e.g., Practical Legal Skills Training, SETON HALL L., 
https://law.shu.edu/students/academics/legal-skills-training/index.cfm (last vis-
ited Oct. 15, 2019) (Throughout the course students are required to step into the 
role of a lawyer and perform legal skills within complex simulations that reflect 
the challenges of real-world practice.”). 
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as dominant a course role as their skills-course counterparts, never-
theless follow the same paradigm.237 The problems are premised on 
assuming the role of a lawyer who is practicing law. 238 
Simulated law practice is the problem. The crucial value added 
in a J.D. course setting is, in fact, a distraction to the master’s stu-
dents, frequently to the point of detriment. Why would this be so? 
The programmatic and course outcomes for master’s students do not 
contemplate their representation of clients. Time and instruction 
spent on the underlying assumption of taking on the lawyer’s role 
undermines the developing professional identity of the affiliated 
non-lawyer professional by, in effect, forcing it through a level of 
translation. While students whose goals include taking the bar exam 
and representing clients are well-served by assignments prompting 
the imagination of themselves in the role of the attorney,239 other 
students are not. If we in legal education believe, as we certainly 
should, in the crucial role that J.D. legal education plays in formative 
professional development, then recognizing the need for analogous 
development of the professional identity of legal master’s students 
is but a small and logical next step. 
A related and ever-present issue in a legal master’s program is 
discouraging the unauthorized practice of law.240 A well-designed 
program will build in training and frequent cautioning against unau-
thorized practice of law throughout the curriculum. Perhaps the most 
important aspect of any such training, however, is repeated empha-
sis on the bright-line prohibition against non-lawyers taking on and 
advising clients in legal matters. All United States jurisdictions 
share this rule in some fashion, despite their variance on numerous 
other questions of what does and does not qualify as unauthorized 
                                                                                                             
 237 See Madison, supra note 207, at 825. 
 238 See, e.g., Practical Legal Skills Training, supra note 236. 
 239 WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR 
THE PROFESSION OF LAW 185–203 (2007). See also William M. Sullivan, After 
Ten Years: The Carnegie Report and Contemporary Legal Education, 14 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 331, 334 (2018) (advocating greater support by law schools in train-
ing future lawyers by “providing entrants to the field effective ways to engage and 
make their own the ethical standards, social roles, and responsibilities of the pro-
fession, grounded in the profession’s fundamental purposes.”). 
 240 See ROMIG & BURGE, supra note 170, at 31–48 (explaining to legal mas-
ter’s students the known and unknown parameters of the unauthorized practice of 
law). 
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practice.241 Accordingly, a further problem with the pedagogy of 
simulated law practice is that it actively engages legal master’s stu-
dents in doing the one thing, above all else, that they are expressly 
prohibited from doing in real life in connection with the law. 
If the lens of simulated law practice is where a fundamental dis-
connect occurs between master’s curriculum and its students, then it 
requires a pedagogical replacement to fill the hole in problem anal-
ysis and legal writing. Though the replacement lens could take sev-
eral possible forms, the most useful descriptive category is simu-
lated client practice. What would such a simulation look like and 
what would it seek to elicit from the student? Consider three exam-
ples from the Legal Analysis and Writing for Clients (“LAWC”) 
course at Texas A&M. In all three examples, the learning outcomes 
include the teaching of legal concepts and communications, but the 
experience is designed to be from the perspective of a client rather 
than a lawyer. 
The first LAWC example is tied to the course unit covering basic 
legal analysis and introducing, by example, the traditional legal 
memorandum. The memo, however, is not the end goal; rather, it 
serves as an illustration of the paradigmatic means by which lawyers 
document and support their analysis of a legal problem. The unit is 
tied to understanding why lawyers do what they do, and, most criti-
cally, recognizing work product in which lawyers are employing tra-
ditional analysis, such that a client can be empowered to take coun-
sel’s predictive analysis into account. 
The summative assignment for this unit involves giving the stu-
dent a legal case file, much like in a 1L course, except that the case 
file already includes what would be the J.D. course final product—
a predictive memorandum. And that is because the actual assign-
ment is still to come. Accompanying the case file is an assigning 
memorandum, which is addressed—not to a “Junior Associate” at a 
law firm—but to the “Assistant Risk Manager” at the client com-
                                                                                                             
 241 See Leonor E. Miranda, Note, Finding a Practical Solution to Bridging the 
Justice Gap for Immigrants in the United States, 30 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 163, 183 
n.135 (2015) (“All 50 states have rules and laws prohibiting the unauthorized 
practice of law, mainly to protect consumers. Non-lawyers are generally prohib-
ited from practicing law; however, what constitutes the ‘practice of law’ or the 
‘unauthorized practice of law’ is by no means uniform, even within the same ju-
risdictions[.]”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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pany. The risk manager must read the case file, the legal memoran-
dum, and additional facts regarding the company’s business situa-
tion. These documents form the basis of the ultimate assignment: 
writing a report to a supervisor that (1) summarizes the legal find-
ings, (2) summarizes the business situation, and (3) makes recom-
mendations for the company in light of the combination of both the 
legal analysis and the business reality. The legal prediction and the 
business facts frequently do not point in the same direction. For ex-
ample, a memorandum predicting that the client company could win 
a breach of contract lawsuit may ultimately be offset by the probable 
negative impact of burning the business relationship with the pro-
spective defendant. Ultimately, the legal master’s student is ac-
counting for the lawyer’s role, but is accomplishing something quite 
different with her report. 
A second example from the LAWC course arises from a unit on 
understanding common and foundational litigation documents, par-
ticularly pleadings and motions. In the underlying simulation, the 
students are given access to selected documents from the docket of 
an actual case. For federal court cases, the raw PDF documents are 
available through PACER,242 which most legal educators can access 
through Bloomberg Law.243 The real case is not random, of course, 
but is one selected for its relevance and application to the final pro-
ject, which is (again) an internal company report. Out of the wealth 
of real and comparatively recent federal cases that are no longer ac-
tive, the instructor should select and carefully curate one involving 
a business dispute and parties that can serve as background for a new 
simulation. 
Consider, for the present description, the use of a breach of war-
ranty lawsuit regarding the quality of commercial building supplies. 
For the new assignment hypothetical, the company employing the 
                                                                                                             
 242 See generally PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT ELECTRONIC RECORDS 
[HEREINAFTER PACER], https://www.pacer.gov (last visited Oct. 16, 2019). 
 243 Although it is a comparative latecomer to the commercial online research 
arena, Bloomberg Law has carved a recognized niche in its expansion of academic 
access to federal court dockets and documents. See, e.g., Dockets and Court Doc-
uments in Bloomberg Law: Getting Started, UCLA SCH. L. HUGH & HAZEL 
DARLING L. LIB., https://libguides.law.ucla.edu/dockets (last updated Feb. 13, 
2019 5:05 PM) (“Bloomberg Law is an excellent alternative to PACER. It pro-
vides access to all dockets available in PACER, and there is no charge to search 
dockets or to retrieve court materials from Bloomberg Law.”). 
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master’s students as risk managers happens to have a similar prob-
lem with the seller who is a defendant in the previous litigation. 
Upon learning that the seller had been sued before, the company 
president obtains the key lawsuit documents from the longtime out-
side counsel, who provides them as a favor to a valued client. The 
president then tasks the risk manager (the student) with reviewing 
the documents and preparing a report in light of information about 
the company’s present situation involving the same seller. The re-
port assignment requires the student to provide (1) a summary of the 
underlying dispute from the prior litigation, (2) a summary of 
what—procedurally—occurred in the prior litigation, and (3) an 
identification of potential problems that may arise in a new lawsuit 
against the seller. In essence, the students are required to demon-
strate literacy in litigation documents sufficient to recognize their 
own possible business concerns and cautionary tales from others. In 
one version of this assignment in the Texas A&M program, the stu-
dents could discern that the seller operates as several, similarly-
named entities, some of which were not subject to the court’s per-
sonal jurisdiction. The students could also report on potential causes 
of action from the previous litigation. In the end, the students are 
able to make a low-cost evaluation of their company’s situation in 
advance of incurring the cost of bringing in outside counsel—a 
worthwhile contribution to the cause of client autonomy.244 Once 
again, the purpose of the assignment is not to simulate the role of 
the lawyer; rather, the goal is to simulate the role of a legally-literate 
business professional—a potential client in the making. 
The third assignment example from the LAWC course at Texas 
A&M involves contract drafting; more specifically, it involves the 
intersection of contract drafting and working effectively with law-
yers. The assignment is, again, not directed to a junior attorney, but 
to a company “Contracting Officer” who is provided the details on 
either a preliminary deal or an area in which her employer needs to 
create a form contract. In initial substance, the assignment packet 
                                                                                                             
 244 See Anthony J. Sebok, What Do We Talk About When We Talk About Con-
trol?, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2939, 2959 (2014) (“[T]he fear that nonlawyers will 
use control to influence the reasons that clients receive concerning legal deci-
sionmaking, while genuine, needs to be balanced against client autonomy: loyalty 
to clients may require lawyers (and nonlawyers) to allow clients to hear opinions 
from whomever the client chooses.”). 
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has much in common with what one might find in a J.D. contract 
drafting course.245 In the lead-up to the assignment, the students re-
ceive instruction in contracting literacy, including typical document 
structures, purposes, and examples of boilerplate, and methods of 
presenting substantive terms. The shift away from the J.D. frame-
work comes in the ultimate assignment. The students are provided 
with specific business goals and concerns that the company wants 
dealt with in the final contract, and the student assignment is to pre-
pare an annotated first draft contract to be sent to the company’s 
general counsel. “First draft” in this context does not mean a rough 
draft. It means a polished product that is nonetheless understood to 
be a precursor to the final product.246 Perhaps the most important 
aspect of this document is that it is annotated. What does annotated 
mean in this assignment? The comment-bubble notes are (1) expla-
nations of why the initial drafter did what she did, and (2) questions 
for the general counsel that arose in the drafting process. 
For learning purposes, the annotations are sometimes more im-
portant to this assignment than is the actual contract text. The mas-
ter’s students are achieving two critical learning outcomes with this 
assignment. First, they are developing legal literacy with regard to 
working in and around contract documents. Business decision mak-
ers ought to be able to understand the private-law agreements to 
which they are or might be bound.247 Contending otherwise is anti-
                                                                                                             
 245 See, e.g., TINA L. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS: HOW AND WHY 
LAWYERS DO WHAT THEY DO 38–55 (2d ed. 2014) (illustrating a leading ap-
proach to contract drafting instruction and assignments designed for a J.D. pro-
gram setting). 
 246 Perhaps oddly, this situation is analogous to legal writing practices that 
predominated among many lawyers before the widespread adoption of word pro-
cessing technology. See Lucia Ann Silecchia, Of Painters, Sculptors, Quill Pens, 
and Microchips: Teaching Legal Writers in the Electronic Age, 75 NEB. L. REV. 
802, 806 n.15 (1996) (“A legal writer in this earlier environment would be con-
cerned primarily with ensuring that a first draft was relatively polished, given the 
practical difficulties in editing. . . . A lawyer in the pre-electronic age would, most 
likely, write with the expectation that there would be less rewriting and revision 
than is possible today.”). 
 247 See Hanna Hasl-Kelchner, The Law-Abiding Executive, BIZED (Nov. 1, 
2006), https://bized.aacsb.edu/articles/2006/november/the-law-abiding-executive 
(observing that, twenty percent of the time, business executives are dealing with 
legal issues for which it is important for them to be legally literate). 
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thetical to the purpose of private law autonomy, which is empower-
ing parties with substantial legal control over their own destinies.248 
Second, the students are developing the skill of effective collabora-
tion with lawyers, a skill that involves and requires a recognition of 
when and how to ask questions. Legal issues do not always show up 
on a company’s doorstep in the prepackaged form of a citation and 
summons. The contract-creation assignment provides an oppor-
tunity for initial issue spotting by the client at a far more subtle level, 
empowering the client with greater facility in knowing when to 
bring in a lawyer.249 
All three of these example assignments teach legal-interaction 
skills but do not place them in the developmentally counterproduc-
tive context of simulating the practice of law. The replacement 
model is simulated client practice. Legal master’s programs should 
not only address students where they are, but courses should be con-
structed around the imagination of where they will be. Although 
these examples are drawn from a skills course, their underlying phi-
losophy should impact doctrinal courses, as well. The problems and 
hypotheticals grounded in a call of the question like “How would 
you advise your client?” should be replaced with the client-side per-
spective, ranging from “What legal risks concern you here?” to 
“What would you do?” realizing that answers to the latter question 
will more than occasionally include the phrase, “I’d consult a lawyer 
regarding . . . .” 
 
3. Prefer practical reality over theory. 
 
                                                                                                             
 248 Burge, supra note 183, at 380–81 (“Proponents of choice-of-law autonomy 
thus find it foundational that in the absence of third-party effects, the parties to 
the transaction should be permitted to choose the applicable law through contract 
without reference to any limiting test. In this view, law is not and should not be 
different from any negotiated and fully private contract term: let law be part of a 
marketplace.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 249 Such empowerment on the client side would also arguably support a client-
centered approach to representation by the lawyer. See Katherine R. Kruse, Be-
yond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 127 
(2010) (describing the client-centered approach as “directly responsive to the 
problem of legal objectification” in that it “urges lawyers to unlearn the profes-
sional habit of ‘issue-spotting’ their clients and to approach their clients as whole 
persons who are more than the sum of their legal interests.”). 
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While the principle of avoiding simulated law practice is rich in 
specifics, the admonition to prefer practical reality is at a high level 
of generality. Most legal academics will intuitively understand what 
it means, even those who involuntarily bristle at such advice. To be 
clear, the principle of focusing on operational legal reality is not a 
knock on legal theory, which has—and should have—a valued place 
in the education of future lawyers. This is true whether we define 
theory as “a doctrinal theory explaining a case or series of cases, a 
school of jurisprudential thought, or a perspective on examining and 
understanding the law.”250 A grounding in big-picture theoretical 
understanding of the law is part of the value added that lawyers bring 
to the table, whether that be the ability to develop a creative argu-
ment or to recognize policy tradeoffs inherent in taking a certain le-
gal position. In these arenas and in applying broad-based theoretical 
knowledge, the attorney truly earns the appellation of counselor,251 
a title law faculty should aspire to develop thoroughly in their J.D. 
students. 
Once again, however, the purposes and aspirations of a legal 
master’s student are not those of a future lawyer.252 The overarching 
goal is to be a legally-informed professional in a career frequently 
adjacent to the law, such as risk management, contract management, 
or human resources. If we take career application as seriously in a 
legal master’s program as we should, then that means shifting course 
resources into practical reality. How might that look in practice? A 
legal master’s course in the doctrinal law of contracts provides ex-
amples for applying the “prefer practical reality” principle, even 
though the practical differences will certainly vary among subjects. 
A contracts course that is more focused on real-world applica-
tion will tend to minimize time spent on offer and acceptance.253 
                                                                                                             
 250 Hoffman, supra note 29, at 627 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 251 See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, What’s Going On? The Psychoanalysis Metaphor 
for Educating Lawyer-Counselors, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1355, 1362 (2013) (assert-
ing that “great lawyers as counselors seek out the interdisciplinary overlap and 
are comfortable operating within it.”); Michael Sullivan, The Lawyer as Counse-
lor, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 253, 256 (2009) (“The Counselor is a value added attorney 
for the client.”). 
 252 See Hersch, supra note 138 at 100. 
 253 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 17–70 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1981) (collecting common law rules on the establishment of mutual 
assent to contract, most frequently through the process of offer and acceptance). 
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The question of what theoretically should or should not qualify as a 
contract is an interesting one, raising questions of the proper role of 
government in enforcing private agreements and of drawing the line 
between gratuitous promises and enforceable ones. In the vast ma-
jority of real-life commercial settings, however, offer and ac-
ceptance matter far less than the broader principle of mutual assent, 
of which offer and acceptance is merely a species. Where assent to 
a negotiated contract is effectively simultaneous, the question of 
who went first will matter very little. Suggesting that offer and ac-
ceptance can be minimized certainly does not mean it will be elimi-
nated. Factual scenarios invoking the common law “mirror image 
rule”254 and its infamously divergent counterpart, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code’s “battle of the forms”255 have substantial conse-
quences for the content of an agreement and deserve coverage. Most 
bar-exam nuances of whether a statement actually is an offer or an 
acceptance do not deserve more than a passing glance. The disap-
pointing but unquestioned reality for those of us who teach the law 
of contracts is that no one in real life is going to offer you $100 to 
walk across the Brooklyn Bridge.256 
Similarly inconsequential is the doctrine of consideration,257 at 
least beyond the basic proposition that a promise must generally be 
exchanged for something of legal value to be enforceable. The over-
whelming majority of commercial transactions—even those involv-
ing consumers—do not raise questions of consideration because 
                                                                                                             
 254 E.g., VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Illinois Trading Co., 811 F.3d 247, 
251 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Under the mirror-image rule . . . a reply to an offer which 
purports to be an acceptance but contains additions, limitations or other modifi-
cations is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a counter-offer.”) (alterations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 255 See U.C.C. § 2-207 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019). 
 256 Mark B. Wessman, Is “Contract” the Name of the Game? Promotional 
Games as Test Cases for Contract Theory, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 635, 647 (1992) (re-
counting how contracts professors have “generated hours of classroom debate 
over the proper treatment of offers of money in return for a stroll across the Brook-
lyn Bridge when the offeror revokes while the hapless offeree is halfway to Man-
hattan”). The hypothetical originated with Professor Maurice Wormser. See I. 
Maurice Wormser, The True Conception of Unilateral Contracts, 26 YALE L.J. 
136, 136 (1916). 
 257 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 71–109 (col-
lecting rules of the common law related to the necessity of consideration or a sub-
stitute for consideration as a prerequisite of contract formation). 
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there is little doubt that the promisor is receiving something valuable 
and not promising a gift. For a legal master’s student, a compara-
tively swift treatment of illusory promises (no legal value and there-
fore no contract)258 and promissory estoppel (no legal value but the 
promise is enforced to avoid injustice)259 could suffice. Peppercorns 
and bargain theory certainly have pedagogical value, but that value 
is most appropriately realized in the J.D. version of the contracts 
course. 
If topics like offer, acceptance, and consideration can get the 
short shrift, then what deserves the full-scale treatment? An evalua-
tion of doctrine that has more real-world application would surely 
have the parol evidence rule260 near the top of the list. The legal 
suppression of prior and contemporaneous statements from the ne-
gotiations leading up to contracting is enormously consequential to 
real-life commercial contracting, both in its ultimate substance and 
also as a cautionary tale about how and why the ultimate written 
agreement matters. Also, contract interpretation deserves the full-
force treatment.261 When private parties reach a point of dispute in 
their transaction, someone at some point is going to read the con-
tract, in many cases well in advance of the involvement of counsel. 
Empowering these parties with an early chance to perceive the legal 
layout of the land is a good thing. Finally, no area of contract law is 
more client-consequential than the law of remedies. Future clients 
are well-served by understanding the foundations of what they are 
getting—or losing—in the event of a breach of contract. 
The illustrative use of contract law here is more a thumbnail 
sketch than a completed portrait, but it makes the point. Legal mas-
ter’s courses are not watered-down versions of their J.D. counter-
parts—rather, they are rebalanced in favor of practical reality in 
topic allocation. In contract law, subjects like the parol evidence 
rule, interpretation, and remedies are amongst the most challenging 
                                                                                                             
 258 See id. § 77. 
 259 See id. § 90. 
 260 See id. §§ 209–218. 
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for students.262 Their preference here, thus, is not because they are 
easy. They certainly are not. Rather, the topics are meaningful for 
career professionals who become legal master’s students because 
they will more likely have cause to use them. Probable use should 
be a touchstone for course topic emphasis in legal master’s pro-
grams. 
The three principles discussed in this Part—focusing on struc-
tural legal literacy, shifting problems to simulated client practice, 
and preferring practical reality in instructional allocation—highlight 
the ways in which a course serving legal master’s students must dif-
fer from a J.D.-only course. The differences are critical if the courses 
are to be successful in leading toward master’s-appropriate student 
learning outcomes. Achieving the course outcomes should, in turn, 
ultimately result in successful programmatic outcomes where the 
two sets of outcomes are properly aligned. At the program level, law 
school master’s programs are bringing substantial and functional le-
gal literacy to professionals whether they are executives, managers, 
bankers, consultants, or entrepreneurs.263 The program objectives 
for legal master’s degrees should build on the strengths of what legal 
education does, but that does not mean legal education should do the 
exact same thing as it does for J.D. students. 
The future could be quite bright for legal master’s programs 
aimed at working professionals who interact with the law but who 
do not seek to practice law. That bright future will only come about, 
however, with intentional program and course design that meets the 
educational goals and needs of legal master’s students. All design 
should lead to access to law. Even when sharing space in a J.D. 
classroom, master’s students deserve much more than to be a J.D. 
afterthought. 
CONCLUSION—TOWARD ACCESS TO LAW 
If legal master’s degree programs are structured correctly, they 
benefit the public at large and are an appropriate priority for legal 
education. These degrees are part of a larger conceptual shift for law 
schools—prioritizing broad access to law over the narrower access 
                                                                                                             
 262 See AMY C. BUSHAW, STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR TEACHING 
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to lawyers that has traditionally been the dominant priority in legal 
education. Legal master’s degrees, whether labeled master of juris-
prudence (“M. Jur.”), juris master (“J.M.”), or otherwise, are a de-
velopment that law schools and attorneys should embrace: a move 
toward greater autonomy in public engagement with the legal sys-
tem. 
Although these innovative degree programs arose at a time of 
economic downturn for legal education, their ultimate value is not 
one of economic opportunism. Rather, they advance the longstand-
ing core public service mission of law schools. While the worthy 
goals of access to justice and to the legal system are traditionally 
conceived in terms of ensuring access to lawyers, the more appro-
priate organizing vision for law schools in the twenty-first century 
should be that of providing access to law—enabling access and un-
derstanding of legal systems both with and without lawyer guidance. 
Law schools’ position within the larger university has evolved and 
diminished prior tendencies toward “law school exceptionalism.”264 
Recent financial concerns in legal education present an opportunity 
for law schools to prove their larger institutional value proposition 
within the broader university. Specific application of that value 
could take many forms, but the non-lawyer master’s degree is a 
readily available means for law schools to expand their mission by 
mediating the gap between the public and legal institutions.265 
Meaningful implementation of a legal master’s program, however, 
requires far more effort than throwing an additional population into 
J.D. courses. Learning outcomes in legal master’s programs have 
significant foundational differences as compared to J.D. programs 
because the students in these programs are not seeking a law license 
or the ability to represent clients. Rather, the master’s students want 
to achieve professional advancement through obtaining a level of 
legal literacy, a level that empowers both decision making and also 
informs the process of working with lawyers. Empowering students 
to reach practical legal literacy requires intentionality on the part of 
legal educators. The M. Jur. is not a duplicate of the J.D. at the cur-
ricular or program level, and master’s program course objectives 
must recognize that fact. The principles for master’s-centered pro-
gram design and course design described in this Article are key 
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touchstones for outcomes that align with the worthy aspirations of 
the new generation of master’s students.266 
While law schools’ traditional mission of educating lawyers re-
mains vibrant and intact, law schools in a liberal and democratic re-
public have a broader public mission. In an age of unprecedented 
access to technology and data, the core public mission of a twenty-
first century law school is and should be access to law. Enabling 
such access through degree programs outside the J.D. and LL.M. is 
a critical piece of accepting this broader mission. 
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